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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Thesis 
There is no doubt but that current American public 
opinion is largely convinced that Russia is bent on world 
domination and that Russia would use military conquest as 
a technique of expansion, if the Soviets felt that it would 
be profitable for them. The whole structure of American 
defense is built upon this presupposition. The network of 
military alliances across the world is predicated upon the 
likelihood of Communist military aggression if no counter-
force were present as a deterrent. The fantastically ex-
pensive continental defense system, with its Distant Early 
Warning Line and strategically located Nike missile sites, 
has been built because it is believed that Russia may 
attack this nation at any time~ 
This situation is in strange contrast to the friend-
ship and good will, the mutual aid and support shared be-
tween the two countries during their struggle against a 
common fascist foe. It is evident that far-reaching changes 
have come about in our relationship with Russia since that 
wartime comradeship. 
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The question inevitably arises when one confronts this 
. altered point of view: how did such a change come about? 
It seems to this writer that a proper answer to this ques-
tion can be found by tracing the development of the key 
presupposition to current American policy toward Russia: 
the fear of imminent Russian surprise attack upon the West. 
This thesis will attempt to trace the historical process in 
which this idea came to be predominant in American opinion, 
and to analyze the causes which brought it to the fore. 
The problem of this thesis, then, is to trace the de-
velopment of the idea of imminent Russian surprise attack 
upon the West as it grew in American public opinion from 
the closing phases of World War II to the time when it be-
came basic to American political and military planning. 
2; Definitions 
It is necessary to indicate what connotations are im-
plied in several of the words and phrases of this statement 
of the problem. In this context, "development" is intended 
to mean "growth toward becoming dominant in public opinion." 
. 
"Imminent," .as here used, implies "possibly occurring in the 
immediate future." It is not intended to carry the infer-
ence of necessarily occurring soon. 
The phrase ttsurprise attack" refers to aggressive mili-
tary action taken without clear and unmistakable warning or 
formal declaration of war. In this thesis, it refers to 
0 
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surprise attack upon the West, that is, upon any or all of 
the nations now connected with the United States or Great 
Britain through military alliances. 
3. Limitations 
This study is limited to the growth of the fear of 
imminent surprise attack as the fear grew in public opinion 
in the United States. Although it will be necessary to in-
clude a brief historical note to put the problem in per-
spective, the scope of time covered will be primarily that 
period from the Teheran Conference in late 1943 to the 
point at which the fear of imminent Russian surprise attack 
, became an open and fundamental assumption in American diplo-
matic and military strategy. 
4. Previous Research in the Field 
Although there have been a number of studies of var-
ious phases of Russian-American relations, none has dealt 
precisely with the growth of the fear of imminent surprise 
attack. 
5. The Methodology of the Thesis 
The method used will be to trace the attitudes of the 
American people and their government officials as these 
attitudes relate to the idea of imminent surprise attack. 
The data used in tracing these attitudes will be popular 
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periodicals, journals, opinion polls, statements by govern-
ment officials, records of the proceedings of Congress, and 
writings reflecting opinion on Russian-American relations. 
This thesis will attempt to show what course of development 
these attitudes actually followed in the period under study, 
then to assess the forces that moved public opinion in that 
direction. 
0 
CHAPTER II 
THE MARRIAGE OF NECESSITY 
1. A Heritage of Mistrust 
William Appleman Williams has recently shown that 
Russian-American tensions go deep into history, back to the 
point in the late nineteenth century where the expanding 
' interests of the two nations clashed in Northwest Asia. 
A review of American-Russian relations from 1781 
to 1917 reveals that the early fri~ndship between 
the two countries was at first blurred and then 
destroyed in the heat of a struggle in Northwest 
Asia. The Bolsheviks did not disrupt the loose 
and informal entente--it was ruptured along the 
rights of way of the South Manchurian and Chinese 
Eastern RailW'ays between 1895 and 1912.1 
The rupture was smoothed over during the first world 
war, only to have relations severed by the Bolshevik revo-
lution. The allied armed intervention in 1918-1919, the 
memory of which has never ceased to burn in the Russian 
mind, served to increase hostility between the United 
States and Russia. 2 
1. William Appleman Williams, American-Russian Relations, 
1781-1947 (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1952), 
p. 4. 
2. This is contrary to the opinion of Vera M. Dean, who 
minimizes intervention and the resulting tensions: 
"During the nearly two centuries that the United 
States and Russia have been in touch with each 
5 
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From 1920 to 1933, the conflict between the two na-
tions and the two opposing economic systems focused on the 
issues of trade and diplomatic recognition of the Soviet 
government by Washington. Soviet spokesmen, especially 
Maxim Litvinov, made repeated efforts to gain official 
recognition for their government. A typical incident, to 
be re-enacted many times in the years between the wars, 
occurred in 1921. 
Litvinov, in a statement from Moscow ~imed at 
Washington, minimized the differences between the two coun-
tires and asserted that Russia was "entirely absorbed in 
the work of internal reconstruction."1 He urged the 
American government to consider "the interests of both peo-
ple which imperatively demand that the wall existing between 
them should be removed."2 
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover answered "that 
negotiations could be opened only after the Soviets an-
nounced the 'abandonment of their present economic system. 1" 3 
other, the relations of the two countries have 
on the whole been friendly, and at no time has 
either threatened to make war on the other." 
Russia: Menace or Promise (Henry Holt and Company, 
1947)' p. 77. 
1. Williams, op. cit., p. 181. 2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
-
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(His opinion was not to change one whit during his residence 
in the White House.) Secretary of State Hughes "agreed that 
no discussions could take place until there was 'convincing 
evidence' that 'fundamental changes' had been effected in 
the economic structure of the Soviet Union.'•1 
Behind this official coldness lay a widely diffused 
distrust on the part of the American people. A survey of 
the controlling factors in the relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union by the Committee on Russian-
~erican Relations of the American Foundation cited the 
attitudes that typified American objections to Russia be-
tween the wars. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
5; 
Ibid. 
They [the Russians] do not live by the principles 
of international law.2 
Russia is committed to promoting world revo-
lution.::S 
. [the Russian government] maintains itself in 
power by a bureaucratic autocracy involving ex-
treme ~ruelty • • • and not stopping at wholesale 
murder and massacre.4 
The communistic and capitalistic systems are 
entirely incompatible.j 
Marriage is taken lightly, family life and 
the education of the child in the home are not 
respected. The church is desecrated and the idea 
of a Supreme Being is repudiated.6 
The United States and the Soviet Union (New York: 
charles Francis Press, 1933), p. 2. 
Ibid., p. 4. 4. Ibid., p. 2. 
-
Ibid. 6. Ibid., p. 3. 
-
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A favorable shift in opinion toward Russia during the 
depths of the depression permitted President Roosevelt to 
recognize the Soviet government in 1933, but this did not 
lead to closer ties. In fact, from that time until the 
beginning of World War II, R~ssian and American interests 
clashed ever more frequ~ntly both in Europe and Asia. 
To be understood in proper perspective, then, the 
cold war must be seen not as a new departure in the rela-
tions between Russia and the capitalist West rising abruptly 
at the end of the Second World War. Rather, it is a new 
phase in an era of hostility. 
2. Comrades in Arms: 1941-1943 
i. In Praise of Russia 
During the first two years of the war, "the differences 
which were to divide the Allie·s were submerged by their com-
mon danger and the sheer struggle to survive."1 The heat 
of the war remolded American opinion about Russia. The 
major portion of the American public was soon expressing 
sympathy, admiration, and affection for the heroic Russian 
people and their leaders. The enthusiasm for the fighting 
spirit of the Russians sometimes even led to a mis-
remembering of history. A. A. Berle, Jr., Assistant 
1. Walter Lippmann, "Peace Settlement with Russia," Repre-
sentative American Speeches, XX:l (1947), 104. 
0 
0 
!I 
'I !I 
1: 
i! 
li 
II jl 
,[ 
9 
[i 
![ Secretary of· State, praised Russia as a great power who 
through the years had "habitually joined with. us". in mat-
ters of importance. 1 Vice President Henry Wallace waxed 
very enthusiastic about the Soviets, and to the nation, his 
sentiments sounded appropriate. 2 
w. Averill Harriman, President Roosevelt's special 
representative to Russia, referred to Moscow as "that 
courageous capital o~ the unconquerable Sov~et Union • . . If 
' and reminded Americans that "we are fortunate to have them 
as allies."3 
Widely-quoted foreign affairs expert William G. Carlton 
of the University of Florida noted that there were.a few 
Americans who had an aversion to co-operating with socialist 
states, but he held this to be unreasonable. ~e looked for-
ward to our good relations with socialist and communist 
states after the war to everyone's mutual advantage.-4 
Joseph E. Davies, former ambassador to Russia, was 
1; lavish in his affection for the country and her leaders. 
,,. 
1. A. A •. Be1::le, Jr. , ttThe Realist Base of American Foreign 
Policy," Vital Speeches, 9:2(N~vember 1, 1942), 54. 
· 2. See, for example, Henry A. Wallace, "Our Friendship with 
Russia," Vital Speeches, 9:3(November 15, 1942), 71-73 • 
. 
3. w. Averill Harriman, "The Churchill-Stalin Conference," 
Vital Speeches, 9:15(May 15, 1943), 749-50. 
4. William G. Carlton, '*This Time We Must Win the Peace," 
Vital Speeches, 9:15(May 15, 1943), 467. 
10 
He scolded those 
few in our country who still bicker at Russia; 
who .still carp at Russia; who still ~uarrel at 
the way in which they live and conduct their own 
government, which is exclusively their own busi-
ness. To do this is to play Hitler's game •••• 
It is neither sensible, wise, nor right to en-
courage criticism of the good faith of fhe Soviet 
government ~r attacks upon its leaders. 
These men ~eflected and expressed the general affection 
in America's attitude toward Russia during the hardest years 
of the war. Most of the few who spoke against the Soviet 
Union were attacked as dupes of the German propaganda that 
was trying to split the allies. Unity was held to be 
essential. 
ii. A Residuum of.Distrust 
There were still some who clung to old hostilities and 
chafed under our close alliance with the Soviets. Ernest K. 
Lindley complained in Newsweek that "from our point of view, 
the Russians have been difficult allies" and asserted that 
the "long heritage of distrust between Russia and the two 
great western democracies • • • has not been surmounted 
yet.u2 
1. Joseph E. Davies, "Russia Today," Vital Speeches, 9:20 (August 1, 1943), 640. 
2. Ernest K. Lindley, "Russia and the Foreign Ministers' 
Meeting," Newsweek, 22:14 (October 4, 1943), 54. 
0 
0 
11 
Others were habitually negative in their references 
to the Soviet Union. Eugene Lyons, editor of the American 
Mercury, ridiculed those who sought to make Stalin respect-
able and lashed out at the general public who were eag~rly 
looking for proof that "Stalinism is a species of democ-
racy" so that they can have their "bruised faith in com-
munism healed."l James M. Gillis, editor of the conserva-
tive Catholic World, was implacable in his opposition to 
Russia and hardly let a month go by without parading the 
pristine purity of his eternal hostility to Communist 
Russia. 2 
For the most part, however, it was only the Gillises, 
the Lyonses, the Colonel McCormicks who managed to hold 
on to their doctrinaire dislike of Russia in face of the 
tide of friendly feeling that flooded the country. Any 
actual difficulties that the alliance was experiencing at 
this stage were minimized. 3 It was easier and ~ore 
patriotic to believe the better side of reports concerning 
1. Eugene Lyons, "State of the Union," The American Mercury, 
54:220(April, 1942), 461-62. 
2. See, for example, The Catholic World's editorial comment 
in 55:927(June, 1942), 257-66, and 55:926(May, 1942), 
129-30. 
3. John R. Deane, general .in charge of the u. S. Military 
Mission in Moscow, 1943-1945, recounts some of these 
difficulties in The Strange Alliance (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1947). · 
12 
Russia. 
iii. High Hopes for the Future 
The New Republic editorial in October of 1943 shows 
the typical analysis of Soviet war aims, giving the 
Russians every benefit of the doubt. 1 "The prime drive in 
th~ir foreign policy is still military security."2 This 
the Russians would seek to .achieve through having friendly 
neighboring governments. They also desire a peaceful 
Europe' so that they can recoup their terrible war-time 
losses and raise their living standards--so t~e argument 
ran. 
Commonweal, taking a peek into the post-war future, 
saw "a strong alliance between four great powers--ourselves, 
England, Russia, and China--cemented by the desire of all 
four to cultivate their own back yards in peace. • • • 
This tendency to hope for the best was characteri,stic 
of American opinion at this stage. The bias was strength-
ened by Stalin'~ dissolution of the Communist International 
in the spring of 1943. Commonweal was certain that this 
1. "What Russia Wants," The New Republic, 109:15(0ctober 
11, 1943), 474-75. 
2. Ibid., p. 474. 
-
3. "The Meaning of the Future," The Commonweal, 37(July 
30, 1943), 15. 
0 
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signified the waning of Russian zeal for world revolution. 1 
George Vernadsky, in a lengthy analysis of Soviet foreign 
policy in The Yale Review, asserted that the move indicated 
a trend away from the international revolution and toward 
nationalistic aspirations. 2 Time announced that the 
"Soviet cycle from world revolution to nationalism had 
run its course.n3 Even Newsweek agreed. 4 
. 
Public opinion polls reflected both the general opti-
mism and the smaller vein of distrust. In early 1943, a 
sampling of the population was asked if they agreed with 
this statement: "In spite of all efforts for peace, na-
tions just can't live together peacefully, so we might just: 
as well expect a war every few.years." Fully 71.0 per cent 
disagreed, 25.1 per cent agreed, and 3.9 per cent said they 
didn't know. 5 
In June of 1943, over 60 per cent in a poll agreed that 
"the chances for making a lasting peace ~fter the war will 
1. "The Meaning of It All," The Connnonweal, 37:7(June 4, 
1943) ' . 159. 
2. George Vernadsky, "Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," 
The Yale Review, 33:4(June, 1944), 699-720. 
3. "Song for the New World,"~' 43:l(January 3, 1944), 32. 
4. "Views on the World's Greatest Enigma," Newsweek, 23:17 (April 23, 1944), 47. .. 
5. "Internationalism," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 7:1 (Spring, 1943), 168. 
0 
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be ••• better than they were after the last war."1 
Another sampli.!lg was asked, "Do you think we shall be able 
to trust the Russians after the war?n2 Forty-three per 
cent chose this answer: "We can confidently trust them to 
act fairly if we do." Twenty per cent thought "we can 
trust the British, but not the Russians. Another 34 per 
cent indicated that "we can't really trust the British or 
the Russians. 
In a Fortune poll made during the spring of 1943, 
only 30.8 per cent thought we might not be able to. avoid a 
war during the next twenty-five to thirty years. 3 Suc-
cessive polls by the American Institute of Public Opinion 
asked, "Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate 
with us after the war?.. The results showed a growing 
confidence. 
Yes No Undecided 
March, 1942 39% 39% 22% 
February, 1943 46 29 25 
April, 1943 44 34 22 
November, 1943 47 27 264 
1. Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New ~ork: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 195o), p. 89. 
2. Ross Stagner, "Public Opinion and Peace Plans," The 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 7:2(Summer, 1943), 30r:-
3. "International Relations," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 
7:3(Fall, 1943), 501. 
4. "Postwar Relations with Russia," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 8:l(Winter, 1944), 156. 
0 
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At the time these polls were being taken, Russian 
expert David J. Dallin was warning that the Soviet designs 
in Europe had not changed appreciably since the time of 
the czars, whose goal it was to control eastern and central 
Europe from Stettin south to Trieste. 1 Few paid him much 
attention. During this period of Russian-American comrad-
ship, his ideas were a small eddy in a stream moving 
swiftly in the opposite direction. The Teheran Conference 
was soon to give disquieting evidence to support Dallin's 
thesis. 
iv. The Big Three at Teheran 
From November 28 to December 1, 1943, the leaders of 
the three allied nations met face-to-face together for the 
first time. The conference was held in Teheran, capital of 
Persia, a country their forces had jointly occupied to use 
as a supply line into Russia. Although the.principal out-
come of the meeting was a firm commitment that all three 
would stay in the war until the end and would move in unity 
toward victory, the Russians showed that they did not feel 
bound by the Atlantic Charter and its guaranties that the 
allies sought no territorial aggrandizement. Stalin re-
affirmed what Molotov had said in the foreign ministers' 
1. David J. Dallin, Russia in Postwar Europe, trans. F. K. 
Lawrence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943)~ 
p. 168. 
0 
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conference in Moscow six weeks earlier--Russia would seek 
to annex sections of Poland, Rumania, Czechoslavakia, and 
Finland. Russia also wanted to be certain that the states 
bordering her on the west had friendly governments. These 
demands did not seem at all to be barriers to Big Three 
unity. 
Stalin pressed for a second front in Europe and re-
ceived assurances that it was coming. 1 Roosevelt spoke 
about his hopes for a United Nations organization to keep 
the peace after the war and received tentative affirmative 
responses. The conference was considered very successful; 
both President Roosevelt and his intimate adviser Harry 
Hopkins thought of the meeting as the peak of their 
careers. 2 
3. Cracks in the Unity: 1944-August, 1945 
i. Currents of Optimism 
The year following Teheran, the currents of good will 
continued to flow from the United States toward Russia. 
People were getting reconciled to the idea that the 
Soviets needed to be re-assured about their security after 
1. Samuel Flagg Bemis, The United States as a World Power (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950), p. 416. 
2. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 775, 778, 799. 
0 
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the war. It was reasoned that the lands that the Soviets 
wanted were ethnically and nationally as much like Russia 
as they were like the countries which held them. 1 There~ 
port circulated that the State Department, too, had 
decided to take a "realistic" rather than an "idealistic" 
1 
view of Russia's designs. 2 The Soviet desire for an 
"outer layer" of friendly states along her borders did 
not seem unnatural either. Just what the Russians meant 
by "friendly states" was not certain, but the fact that 
the Commintern had been dissolved re-assured people that 
the border states would probably not be sovietized. 3 
President Roosevelt said in a fireside chat on March 
8, 1944, 
I think the Russians are perfectly friendly; they 
aren't trying to gobble up all· the rest of Europe 
or the world •••• They haven't got any crazy 
ideas of conquest. • • • These fears that have 
been expressed by a lot of people here--with some 
reason--that the Russians are going to try to 
dominate Europe4 I personally don't think there's anything in it. 
1. Joachim Joesten, "Why Stalin Acts that Way," The Nation, 
158:14(April, 1944), 389. 
2. William G. Carlton, "We Are Losing the Battle for Col-
lective Security," Vital Speeches, 10:19(July 15, 1944), 600. • -
I ~. "Views on the world's Greatest Enigma," Newsweek, 23:17 (April 24, 1944), 47. 
4. Henry M. Wriston, Diplomacy in a Democracy (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1956 , pp. 9o-91. 
0 
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Russophile Anna Louise Strong's article in The Nation 
in the fall of 1944 also exhibited the currents of optimism 
that were running strong. Her answer to the oft asked 
question, nWhat does Russia want?" was that above all else 
Russia wanted peace and security and friendship. She wrote 
that the Soviets 
r~gard American and British friendship with the 
Soviet Union as infinitely more important to 
world peace and progress than a Soviet Poland, 
Rumania, or even France. • • • 
The Soviet Union wants governments in the 
border states which will be sufficiently capital-
istic to win American and British recognition • • • 
but which will be at the same time definitely 'anti-
fascist' and friendly to the Soviets. • • • It wants 
them to serve·, not as a cordon sanitaire between 
the Soviet Union and the Western world, but as a 
bridge. . 
Most of the American public agreed with this approach 
to the question of what Russia wanted. An August, 1944 poll 
showed that 45 per cent of the population thought.Russia 
did not have expansionist aims, but was only trying to at-
tain security through friendly neighboring governments. 
Twenty-two per cent went even further and said they ex-
pected Russia to follow a real "good neighbor" policy. 2 
1. Anna Louise Strong, "Russia's Post-War Policy," The 
Nation, 159:17(0ctober 21, 1944), 460-61. ---
2. Almond, op. cit., p. 94. 
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ii. Trends toward Disillusionment 
Doubts about Russia were slowly taking root, however. 
Sam Rayburn, perennial speaker of the House, told the rep-
resentatives that any doubts about Russia that they might 
have ought to be pushed into the background. Speaking to 
his colleagues in January of 1944, he cited some unfortu-
nate signs of distrust that were appearing. 
Then somebody says to me: "\..fuat are we going to 
do with Russia after the war is over?" "What is 
Russia going to do after the war is over?" What 
I am interested in in 1943 and 1944 is what 
Russia is doing now. We will settle those things 
after the war is over.l 
Doubters were not to be put off so easily. Dr. William 
G. Carlton, ever a sensitive observer of American reactions 
to R~ssia, reported in early summer of 1944 that there was 
a widespread belief "that Russia will not cooperate in a 
world organization to keep the peace." Dr. Carlton rallied 
the generally accepted arguments against this view--the 
fact that Russia was war weary, and that she needed peace 
for reconstruction--and added another, that there is a 
kind of pacifism historically.inherent in socialism that 
made it seek for peace. 2 
1. Sam Rayburn, "We Must Have Unity," Vital Speeches, 10:8 
(Februa~y 1, 1944), 229. 
2. William G. Carlton, "We are Losing the Battle for Col-
lective Security," Vital.Speeches, 10:19(July 15, 1944), 
601. 
0 
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It was only three months later, in October, that 
Dr. Carlton was·quoted as warning that we must be real-
istic about the possibility of a "rift" between the United 
States and Russia. 1 He reminded Americans that when the 
war is over America and Russia will be the two great 
powers of the world. The economic and political systems 
of these two nations differ, and their interests clash in 
many parts of the globe. Alert to the changing atmosphere, 
he stated th?t a "drift toward rivalry" with Russia was 
now in process. 2 
Dr. Carlton was right. Negative reaction to Russia 
was slowly growing. A number of people charged her with 
violating the Atlantic Charter by seeking territorial 
gains. Montana Senator Burton K. Wheeler said in a speech 
that the United States was not fighting to establish com-
munism in Yugoslavia or the Balkan states or to get a 
piece of Finland ~or Russia. 3 
Irritation grew at Russia's high-handedness, which was 
showing that she considered the Balkan nations hers to 
1. William G. Carlton, "The Convergence of the American 
and Russian Systems," Vital Speeches, 11:4(0ctober 11, 
1944)' 98-104. 
2. Ibid. 
-
3. Burton K. Wheeler, "Sound American Policy," Vital 
Speeches, 10:23(September 5, 1944), 715. 
0 
0 
21 
control and would brook no interference. The Soviets had 
never actually declared war on Bulgaria, but in October, 
1944, just as the Americans and British were sitting down 
' I 
with Bulgarian leaders in Cairo to arrange an armistice, 
Russia declared war and swiftly occupied the country. 
Churchill called this intervention "both startling and 
effective."1 It was fast becoming clear that Russia 
would handle all the armistice n~gotiations for the Balkan 
area in the future. 
Additional disagreements arose over a variety of issues, 
such as oil concessions in Iran, and who should participate 
in a civil aviation conference in Chicago. Noting the dis-
ruptions, The Nation observed as 1944 drew to a close that 
"recent events serve to underscore the precarious character 
of the unity among the big three 'United Nations.•n2 
iii. The Conference at Yalta 
In February of 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin 
met in the historic conference at Yalta in the Crimea. 
This was to go down in history as one o~ the most dramatic 
events in American diplomacy. There plans were made for 
the final military operations against Germany, and the 
1. "Bear in the Balkans," Newsweek, 24:15(0ctober 9, 1944), 
59. 
2. "Not United Enough," The Nation, 159:. 20 (November 11, 
1944), 577. 
c 
c 
22 
occupation of the defeated nations with separate zones for 
each of the allies under a central control commission. The 
Big Three announced a conference to be called in San 
Francisco to set up a United Nations organization, and that 
they had agreed upon voting procedures i~ its security 
council. They pledged that the liberated nations would 
be given provisional governments representative of all 
democratic elements in the population, these to be followed 
by free elections establishing ~ jure governments. They 
provided for periodic meetings of the Big Three foreign 
ministers and made agreements concerning Russia's entry 
into the war against Japan. 
The American delegation had no doubts but that the 
Russians would live up to their agreements. 
The mood of the American delegates, including 
Roosevelt and Hopkins, could be described as 
one of supreme exultation as they left Yalta. 
• • • Hopkins later said to me [reported Robert 
Sherwoodj, 'We really believed i~ our hearts 
that this was the dawn of the new day we had 
all been praying for and talking about for so 
many years. We were absolutely certain that we 
had won the first great victory of the peace--
and by "we," I mean all of us, the whole civilized 
human race. The RusSians had proved that they 
could be reasonable and farseeing and there wasn't 
any doubt in the minds of the President or any of 
us that we could live with them and get along 
with them peacefully for as far into the future 
as any of us could imagine.'" 1 
1. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 870. 
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iv. The Specter of World War III 
As the war in Europe progressed in early 1945 to the 
stage of mopping up operations, however, and attempts were 
made to carry out the Yalta agreements, allied unity fal-
tered, and so did the easy optimism about Russia and the 
postwar world that had been prevailing. 
German propaganda worked hard at trying to widen the 
cracks that were developing in allied co-operation. The 
government that took up the threads of remaining power in 
Germany after the death of Hitler tried to maneuver a 
separate surrender to the United States and Great Britain 
with an offer to help them in fighting the Russians. 1 It 
is impossible to judge whether this effort of the Germans 
had any effect at all upon the West, but the German 
leaders had apparently convinced many of their follow~rs 
they were being successful. A number of German army uni~s 
were shocked when their. American captors disarmed th~ for 
they fully expected to be allowed to keep their weapons and 
to assist in fighting Russia. 2 But the possible threat of 
armed conflict among the allies had been averted by the 
agreements on military occupation zone boundaries. 
1. ttThe Occupation,"~' 45:2l(May 21, 1945), 24. 
2. Ibid. 
-
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Questions about how Russia would use her new position 
of power were a part of the increasing tensions between 
the West and the Soviet Union. The feeling was growing 
that these tensions might lead to war. Arthur Koestler 
expressed this feeling when he wrote The Yogi and the 
Commissar, published in early June, 1945. In the book of 
essays he stated that the thrust of Russian westward ex-
pansion was inevitable.1 He predicted that the technique 
Russia would use would be brisk surprise blows inter-
spersed with periods of good will. 2 Koestler was one of 
the first prominent persons to speak of Russian surprise 
attack as a real danger. 
On June 11, 1945, Time reported that "last week the 
-
possibility of World War III was more and more in the 
horrified world•s public eye," and that so many important 
people were speaking of war as inevitable that it was no 
longer considered news. 3 The news was being made by 
those few who continued to talk as though war was not 
necessarily awaiting the nation. The article was a vast 
exaggeration of the real situation, but it was a fact 
1. Arthur Koestler, The Yogi and the Commissar (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1945), pp. 2o3-2o4. 
2. Ibid., p. 206. 
3. "World War II.I?" Time, 45: 24(June 11, 1945), 24. 
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that more prominent people were speaking about the possi-
bility of war than before. 
v. Data from the Polls 
Public opinion polls still showed that, in spite of 
the new tensions, the general attitude of the American 
people toward Russia was one of cautious optimism. A 
January, 1945 poll showed that 70 per cent of the popula-
tion thought that the United States could get on with 
Russia better than before the war. 1 Those who expected 
the United States to be at war within the next twenty-
five years rose just slightly from 38 per cent in March 
to 40 per cent in August. 2 
Just as victory over Japan became a.reality, another 
poll showed that 30 per cent saw Russia's aims in Eastern 
Europe as "defensive"; 25 per cent of the people attached 
. 
pure economic or humanitarian motives to Russia's East 
European policy; 20 per cent had no opinion; and another 
25 per cent thought that Russia was trying to extend the 
Communist orbit in Eastern Europe. 3 
1. Almond, op. cit., p. 94. 
2. Reported in The Public §!inion Quarterl~, Summer and 
Fall issues of 1945 (Vo • 9, Nos. 3 an 4). 
3. Almond, op. cit., p. 90. 
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Gabriel Almond estimates from opinion poll data that 
American opinion about Russia at the end of the war was 
' divided into three rough groups: (1) about 20-30 per cent 
were "deeply and invariably distrustful"; (2) 20-30 per 
cent were "fully sold on Russia's amicable and peaceful 
intentions"; (3) 40-60 per cent constituted a large mid-
dle group "whose attitudes ranged from non-committal to 
hope and moderate optimism." 1 
A good basis thus existed for building a-relationship 
of friendliness and mutual trust with the Soviet Union. 
1. Ibid. , p • 9 5 • 
c 
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. CHAPTER III 
THE SHIFTING OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES: SEPTEMBER, 1945·1946 
1. A Curtain of Iron 
Clare Booth Luce expressed a new look that a number 
of Americans were taking at Russia as hostilities were 
ending. She said that we must not overlook the crimes 
of communism. We must apply the same moral standards in 
judging Russia as we had used in judging Germany. 
Our gratitude is so very, very great to the heroic 
people of Russia, who helped us gain ••• victory. 
But a decent respect for the opinions of mankind 
requires that we examine the immoral nature of 
this communism that is sweeping Europe.l 
After examining communism' s "immoral nature" Mrs. Luce 
concluded, "This cannot long remain two worlds, as it is 
today--the world of totalitarianism and the world of 
liberty. " 2 
Mrs. Luce was reacting to what was already happening 
in the countries of Eastern Europe. According to the terms 
of Yalta, the allies had recognized Russia's right to have 
"friendly governments" around her. It was specified, 
1. Clare Booth Luce, "America and World Communism," Vital 
Speeches, 11:2l(August 15, 1945), 649. 
2. Ibid. 
-
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however) that dhose governments would be representative of 
all democratic sections of the population and would be fol-
lowed by free elections. A few weeks after Yalta, Russia 
imposed a communist government on Rumania. Bulgaria soon 
followed. 
In the negotiations concerning a new government for 
Poland which would include not only members of the Lublin 
group which the Russians sponsored, but also persons from 
the Polish government in exile in London, the West began 
to understand for the first time just what the Russians 
meant by "friendly governments." The Soviets eventually 
c~nceded to vigorous Western protests and allowed a govern-
ment representing both group~ to sit in Warsaw for a short 
while. One-by-one, 'ho~ever, the non-communist members 
were eliminated. A similar pattern of events was to fol-
low in Hungary. 
These developments were concurrent with the sealing 
off of borders with Western Europe, the enforcement of 
rigid travel restrictions, and the clamping of tight censor-
ship on the Russian occupied areas. The Joint Allied Control 
Commission discovered that it had no effective jurisdiction 
over the Russian zones. By March 5,.1946, Sir Winston 
Churchill was able to speak of an "iron curtain" having 
been drawn across East~rn Europe. 1 
1. Sir Winston Churchill, "Alliance of English Speaking 
People," Vital Speeches, 12:ll(March 15, 1946), pp. 329-332. . 
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Speaking at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, 
with President Truman behind him on the platform, 
Sir Winston called for mutual defense and security agree-
ments between the United States and the British Common-
wealth. He said: 
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the 
Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across 
the continent. • • • 
Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its 
communist international organization intends to 
do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, 
if any, to their expansive and proselytizing 
tendencies. • ·• • 
On the other hand I repulse the idea that a 
new war is inevitable; still more that it is im-
minent. • • • I do not believe that Soviet Russia 
desires war. What they desire is the fruits of 
war and-the indefinite expansion of their power 
and doctrines. • •• From what I have seen of our 
Russian friends and allies during the war, I am 
convinced that there is nothing they admire so 
much as strength, and there is nothing for which 
they have less respect than military weakness.l 
The general population of this country was not so 
ready as Sir Winston to admit relations with Russia had 
reached a state where military security was needed against 
them. Most "viewed with distaste and alarm the kind of 
military marriage proposed by Churchill: such an alliance 
would only provoke suspicion. ••• " 2 A poll taken on 
1. !E!£., pp. 331-32. 
2. "Mr. Truman's Bal~oon," Time, 17:ll(March 18, 1946), 19. 
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April first showed that of the 68 per cent who knew about 
churchill's suggestion of a u.s.-British alliance to ~heck 
Russia, 18 per cent approved and 40 per cent disapproved. 1 
This poll cannot be understood, however, as indicat-
ing that crucial changes in America's attitude toward 
Russia had not been taking place in the preceding months. 
As negotiations over recognition of the Polish and Balkan 
governments had dragged from late 1945 into 1946, a definite 
shift in public opinion about Russia could be seen. 
This shift in attitudes was noticeable especially in 
the "jelling" of the feeling that war with Russia was 
inevitable. In August, 1945, only 40 per cent had expected 
the nation to be at war within twenty-five years. This 
rose sharply in an October poll to 54 per cent. By March 
of 1946 it was 64 per cent. 2 This feeling continued high 
during 1946, with polls in May and September showing 62 per 
cent predicting war within the stated period. Another 
March, 1946 poll revealed that 49 per cent of the people 
thought the United States would be at war within ten years. 
Apparently the negative reaction to Churchill '·s suggestion 
1. "International Relations·," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 
10:2(Summer, 1946), 264. 
2. This and the immediately following poll data are from 
polls reported in Vol. 10, Nos. 2, 3, and 4 (Summe~'Fall, 
Winter, 1946). . 
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was due not so much to a cheery optimism about Russian 
aims, but to a fear of making an alliance that might pro-
voke Russia while there was still some hope. 
Time showed, though, that negative feeling toward 
Russia continued to mount. From early 1946 onwards, 
"well over a majority in a series of national samplings 
viewed Russia as aiming to build herself up to be the 
ruling power ~f the world."1 At the same time, the number 
of those willing to-have the United States Government 
"make every possible effort" to keep on friendly terms 
with Russia fell from 23.per cent in September of 1945 to 
15 per cent in July of 1946. 2 A series of Gallup polls 
in 1946 indicated 60 per cent or more felt that American 
policy toward Ru$sia w:as too "soft~"3 
2. Rays of Cautious Optimism 
Even if many people did think that'war might be com-
ing, the immediacy of a Russian military threat was not 
felt keenly. The demobilization of American armed forces 
from their strength of eleven million men to one and a 
half million proceeded with rapidity. The Truman 
1. Almond, op. cit., p. 95. 2. Ibid., p. 97. 
-
3. These were reported in Vol. 10, Nos. 2-4, and Vol •. 11, 
No. 1 of The Public Opinion quarterly. 
32 
administration, still hopeful of being able to deal trust-
fully with the Russians, proposed in mid-July, 1946, be-
fore the United Nations, a'plan 
for an International Atomic Development Authority, 
to which the United States wou1d turn over its 
atomic secrets, provided that there were inter-
national control and inspection. The control and 
inspection were to apply to all nations and to be 
subject to no veto. Further manufacture of bombs 
was to cease immediately, and existing bombs were 
to be destroyed.! 
Russia dashed many hopes when she refused to accept any 
kind of international inspection, but the plan itself, 
submitted in good faith, showed that the administration 
had not_ yet given up hopes for co-operation. 
The influential military analyst, Major George 
Fielding Eliot, expressed the same cautious optimism. 
There is actually no irreconcilable conflict 
betweert the constitutional-capitalistic system of 
. the Anglo-American nations and the statist-
socialist system of the u. S. S. R. 2 No deep lying moral issue is here involved. 
In assessing the situation, Major Eliot came to the 
conclusion that 
Neither a planned war nor a war brou~ht about by 
deliberate creation of conditions wh~ch would lead 
1. Herbert Agar, The Price of Power (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 55. 
2. George Fielding Eliot, The Strength We Need (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1946), p. 49. 
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to war can offer any military attraction for the 
Russian leaders • • • and therefore it is not an 
unreasonable assumption that no fuch war is 
likely to occur for the present. 
Most people were not thinking of Russian surprise 
attack as an imminent danger. 
3. Getting Tough with Russia 
i. Journey into Doubt 
33 
It is interesting to trace the development of 
President Truman's attitudes toward Russia during his first 
year in office follow.ing Roosevelt's death in April of 1945. 
Mr. Truman had no experience of his own with the Russians 
and shared in the cheerful hope that prevailed in 
Washington when he took office. 2 No sooner had he become 
president than he was involved in the middle of long and 
disillusioning negotiations over the "Polish Question." 
In the process of his secon~ conference with Molotov, 
he told the Sov~et foreign minister "that in its larger 
aspects the Polish question had become for our people the 
symbol of the future development of our international rela-
tions."3 
1. ill2.·) p. 55. 2. Agar, op. cit., pp. 10·-11. 
3. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday 
and Company, Inc., 1955), I, 76. 
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Mr. Truman saw the issue as a clear and simple one. 
Agreements had been made at Yalta about the type of 
government Poland was to have. He kept asktng Molotov, 
"Why don't you carry out your agreements~ You made them. 
Why don't you keep them?"1 At this stage he felt certain 
that the Russians could be convinced that they had nothing 
to fear from America, and then they would co-operate fully. 
When, in the closing days of the war in Europe, 
Churchill urged President Truman an4 General Eisenhower 
to drive as deeply into Eastern Europe as possible to gain 
a good bargaining position with Russia, Truman rejected 
the proposal. After all, agreements had been made about 
occupation zones. When the German surrender came, much 
to Churchill's dismay, Mr. Truman ordered American troops 
to withdraw to the agreed-upon boundaries, moving troops 
back as much as one hundred fifty miles at points. 
Truman, like Roosevelt before him, felt certain that 
the disagreements arising between Russia and the West 
could be best handled on a man-to-man basis, and urged 
a meeting of the three heads of state. This conference 
took place at Potsdam in July, 1945, "where the American 
leaders discovered the second phase of disillusionment--
no longer [did the Americans ask] 'Why don't they keep 
1. Ibid., pp. 79-82 • 
........... 
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their promises?' but rather, 'Are there any bounds to 
their ambitions?'"l President Truman wrote later that at 
Potsdam he had found "the Russians were relentless bar-
gainers, forev~r pressing for every advantage for them-
selves."2 
Little was settled at Potsdam. Almost all the knotty 
problems of ~he peace treaties for defeated nations were 
referred to ~he foreign ministers to handle in subsequent 
meetings. The foreign ministers'· conferences were held 
in London the following September, in Moscow in December, 
then again in Paris during April and May of 1946. The 
Paris conference recessed for the summer, then reconvened 
in September. During the negotiations in these meetings 
as they dragged on with the appearance that the Russians 
really did not want the problems settled, Truman's atti-
tude grew more pessimistic and distrustful. After the 
failure of the Moscow Conference he told Secretary Byrnes, 
"I'm tired of babying the Soviets.••3 
iii. A Fight within the Cabinet 
In September of 1946 a controversy within the 
President's cabinet broke into the open and showed that 
1. Agar, op. cit., p. 29. 
2. Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 411. 3. Ibid., p. 552 
-
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official policy was solidifying into a "tough" attitude 
toward Russia. On September twelfth, while Secretary of 
State Byrnes was in Paris still trying to get negotiatio~s 
to lead to peace treaties for all ·the occupied countries, 
Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace spoke to a political 
rally in Madison Square Garden. 
In his address Wallace rej ec.ted the concept of an 
alliance of mutual defense with Great Britain as the "key 
to our foreign policy."1 We ought not to get involved in 
the ttballance of power manipulations" which characterize 
British diplomacy. 2 Wallace contended that we must 
analyze Russia's history and character in forming our 
policy toward her. If we did so, we would realize that 
ttwe are reckoning with a force which cannot be handled 
successfully by a 'get tough with Russia' policy."3 
Wallace proposed that we allow Russia the control of 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans,. and seek to neutralize 
China and to build up a United Nations military force. 4 
Secretary Wallace had released this speech to the 
press the morning of the day that he delive.red it. In 
1. Henry A. Wallace, "Is American Foreign Policy Leading 
to War?tt Representative American Speeches, X.X:l(l947), 
37. 
2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., p. 38. 
-
4. Ibid., pp. 39-41. 
-
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answer to queries about it from reporters in his press 
conference that day, President Truman said that he had 
read it and that it represented his and the State Depart-
ment's ideas. 1 When reports of Wallace's address reached 
Secretary Byrnes in Paris, he was greatly disturbed and 
called Truman to discuss it with him. Critical reaction 
also flowed in from the Western capitals. 
President Truman found it necessary to retract his 
previous statement to the press. He explained that he had 
not actually read the document and had not intended to 
endorse what Wallace was going to say; he had only meant 
that he approved Wallace's right to make the speech. 2 
During the next week Secretary Wallace made his 
views on foreign policy even clearer in a public letter 
to the president as the controversy raged. His position 
was in outright opposition to that of Secretary Byrnes. 
Byrnes wrote the president saying that he would resign 
immediately if Wallace's attacks continued. 3 On September 
twentieth, President Truman asked for and received 
Wallace's resignation from the cabinet. 
1. The data surrounding this address are recounted in de-
tail in the preface to the text of the speech in~., 
pp. 35-36. 
2. Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 557.· 3. Ibid., p. 559. 
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At the beginning of this incident, it appeared that 
American policy toward Russia was still somewhat flexible, 
perhaps even undecided. When the incident was finally 
closed, it had marked the solidification of Washington's 
attitude into a "tough" policy toward the Soviets. 
In this atmosphere, the words of caution which Russian 
, expert Vera Micheles Dean was penning sounded rather poign-
ant: 
We must be constantly on guard against the 
possibility. that the atmosphere of war in which 
we have been living may have made us unjustifi-
ably suspicious of the motives of other peoples; 
and that we may be attributing to Russia sinister 
motives for actions which, from Moscow's point of 
view, can be explained by the historical develop• 
ment and centuries-old aspirations of the Russian 
nation.l 
But calm reasonableness was not the mood in Washington. 
They had decided to "get tough with Russia." 
4. Growth of the "Pearl Harbor Complex" 
It is difficult to ascertain with certainty what role, 
if any, American military leaders were playing in the build 
up of anti-Russian sentiment. We do know that General 
Eisenhower and the other military chiefs were adverse to 
11 taking any steps in the closing phases of the war that 
1. Vera Micheles Dean, Russia: Menace or Promise (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1947), p. 91. 
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"mixed politics with military planning~" that is, allowed 
any supposed rivalry with Russia have any bearing on the 
conduct of the war. 1 We may judge from this that they 
probably did not give much weight to speculation about a 
threat from the Soviets.· 
After the war there were occasional statements of a 
"sensational" nature by military leaders. General Patton 
was quoted as saying to some Los Angeles Sunday School 
children in an Episcopal church that "you children here~ 
whether you like it or not, are the soldiers and nurses of 
the next war. There will be war again because there have 
always been such things."2 In June, 1946, Senator Glen 
Taylor told reporters that "the brass and braid told the 
Senate committee there may be another war soon."3 It is 
impossible to say what might have transpired in the hear-
ing roqms of Congressional committees. 
Public utterances of military leaders, however, were 
very circumspect, much more so than those of man~ politi-
cians. One reason may have been that the military chiefs 
1. Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 212. 
2. Kenneth McFarland, "Momentous September," Vital 
Speeches, 12:l(October 15, 1945), 13. 
3 ... World War III?" Facts on File, 6:294(June, 1946), 
177. 
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were pressing hard for Universal Military Training and 
were afraid that sensational tactics might harm their 
efforts to make the training sound almost routine for a 
modern democracy. 
40 
In any d~scussion of the military aspects of Russian-
American relations that did take place, the "Pearl Harbor 
Complex" was unmistakable. It involved the idea that in 
our era wars begin with "Pearl Harbors"--that is, with 
surprise attacks. Here the military along with civilian 
advocates of Universal Military Training did play a role. 
Those who during 1946 and 1947 worked assiduously for the 
passage of compulsory training bills said that the reason 
we needed such a militaxy reserve was to carry out our 
. . 
commitments in Europe and to the United Nations. But they 
also reminded p·eople in almost every speech that we must be 
ready.for the next Pearl Harbor if and when it should come, 
for with modern weapons, there would be no interlude fol-
lowing an attack in which we could mobilize our forces. 
The name of any possible aggressor was never mentioned, 
but any idea of the possibility of war carried with it the 
corollary that such a war would start with a surprise a~tack 
upon the West. 
0 
CHAPTER IV 
MARCHING TOWARD THE BLOCKADE: 1947 THROUGH JUNE, 1948 
1. Declaration of Cold War 
1946 had been a year of disillusionment fo~ the 
American people. The course of events in 1947.was not 
destined to ease the pain of adjustment to a world vastly 
different from their expectations at the end of the war. 
As Secretary of State Byrnes had noted in his October, 
194~report on the Paris Conference, tensions with Russia 
were mounting. 1 
On January 19 of the new year, Iran charged Russia 
with interfering in her internal affairs. Iran had been 
occupied jointly by the British, Americans, and Russians 
during the war, and had provided the main supply route 
into the Soviet Union. At Yalta the occupying powers had 
jointly agreed to evacuate troops from Iran following the 
cessation of hostilities. American and British troops were 
removed, and the Russians appeared to be leaving. It was 
discovered, however, that before all the Russian troops 
had withdrawn, they had reversed their direction. More 
1. James F. Byrnes, "We Oppose Privilege and Defend Free-
dom," Vital Speeches, 13:2(November 1, 1946), 39. 
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Soviet forces had entered the country, set up a puppet 
government in the northeast provinces, and cut off com-
munications between that area and Teheran. This appeared 
to be another in the pattern of broken agreements. 
The long-drawn negotiations for the establishment of 
a democratic government in Poland came to a heartbreaking 
end with the general.election held in that nation on 
January 19. The State Department protested that their re-
ports showed conclusively that the election had failed to 
be a truly "free expression of the will of the Polish 
people," but to no avail. Poland, in whose behalf France 
and Britain had entered the war, was lost for the foresee-
able future as a free democratic nation. 
In February, Britain informed President Truman that 
she was going to have to end her financial and military 
support of the Greek government. In the allied division 
of occupation responsibilities at the end of the war, 
Greece, for long a part of the British sphere of influence, 
was given over to British occupation. Almost from the time 
they entered the country British troops were engaged in 
military action against Greek partisans. The partisans 
were able to fade across the borders of communist neighbors 
when hotly pursued, there to regroup and sally out again. 
The fighting and the task of maintaining the Green govern-
ment was too great a strain on the threadbare British 
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economy. In giving the option on action t~ President 
Truman, Ch~rchill warned that if no one took up the burden, 
the Greek economy would collapse. This together with the 
pressure that Russia was putting on Turkey both for terri-
torial concessions, control of the Dardanelles, and'mili-
tary bases, convinced Truman that if no action was taken 
Greece and Turkey would soon become Russian satellites. 
President Truman decided that the United States would 
have to take up the responsibility for attaining stability 
in the area. Mr. Truman went before Congress on March 12 
I 
and asked for $400 millions for military and economic aid 
to Greece and Turkey. He stated American policy in what 
was to be known as the Truman Doctrine: 
I believe that it must be the policy of the United 
States to support free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressures. 
Senators Claude Pepper and Glen Taylor led the oppo-
sition to the proposal. Senator Pepper said: 
The effect of this proposal, if enacted, is offi-
cially to brand the United Nations as a failure, 
and of no force or power to achieve the sacred 
functions for which it was founded.2 
1. Harry s. Truman, "Aid to Greece and Turkey," Vital 
Speeches, 13:ll(March 15, 1947), 323. 
2. Claude Pepper, "Against Aid to Greece and Turkey," 
Representative American Speeches, XX:l(l947), 74. 
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As Congress debated, the United Nations investiga~ing com-
mittee sent to Greece to inquire into the charges that 
rebels were receiving help from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 
reported affirmatively. The Senate, under the leadership 
of Arthur Vandenberg, approved the aid bill on April 10, 
by a vote of 67 to 23. 
This measure clarified just what the implications of 
a "tough" policy toward Russia were. President Truman's 
own estimation is that "this was • • • the turning point 
in America's foreign policy, which now declared that where-
ever aggression, direct or indirect, threatened the peace, 
the security of the United States was involved."! 
Bernard Baruch summed it all up very aptly: "Let us 
not be deceived--we are today in the midst of a cold war."2 
2. Searching for Salvation for Europe 
i. The Plan of the General 
The State Department, now under the direction of 
General George Marshall, was dubious that the aid to Greece 
and Turkey and the few scattered loans·the country had 
made would be sufficient to stem the tide of European 
1. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday. and Company, Inc., 1955), II, 106. 
2. Ernest w. Lefever, Ethics and United States Foreign 
Policy (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1957), p. 30. 
disintegration. It was a question as to whether or not 
Europe could be saved. 
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The situation was even worse in China, ravaged by the 
years of war, torn by civil strife, and almost helpless 
. . 
under a corrupt government. The decision had to be made'· 
as to how much the United States could do to fortify 
Western Europe and Asia. Secretary of State Marshall and 
his planning staff under George Kennan concluded that our 
resources were not enough to make a substantial difference 
in both areas and that Western Europe should receive top. 
priority. 1 
On June 5, speaking·at Harvard University, Secre~ary 
Marshall called for the European governments to meet, 
declare their joint needs, and suggest methods that the 
United States could help to meet them. 2 The invitation 
included Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe. An-
nouncing that "our policy is not directed against any 
country of doctrine but against hunger, ·poverty, despera-
tion, and chaos," he promised-that the United States would 
do her best to aid their joint economic recovery. 3 
1. Agar, op. cit., p. 71. 
2. George c. Marshall, "European Unity,n Vital Speeches, 
13:18(July 1, 1947), 553-54. 
3. Ibid., p. 553. 
-
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The war-torn nations of Europe met i~ediately to 
set up a plan for meeting their economic needs through 
American aid. Molotov attended briefly, but left after 
delivering a blistering attack on American imperialism. 
Poland and Czechoslovakia made plans to send representa-
tives to the meeting only to have them vetoed by Russia. 
The Marshall Plan went before Congress in January of 
1948. It marked the death struggle of isolationist senti-
ment in the legislature. The whole nation debated the 
plan's merits. It was attacked by Taft on the right as 
involving the United States too deeply and at too great 
an expense in European affairs. It was attacked from the 
far left as being only a veiled threat toward Russia. 
However, Senator Vandenberg, aided by a ground swell of 
public opinion in its favor, piloted the Economic 
Co-operation Act through the Republican controlled senate. 
He also received considerable assistance from the February 
25 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the last outpost of 
democracy in Eastern Europe. 
The lengthy public debate over the Marshall Plan 
reached deep into the grass roots of American society 
and served to solidify the country's apprehension about 
Russian communist expansion. There was no question now 
in which direction public opinion bad moved. 
The public was listening in 1947 to the kind of at-
tacks upon the Soviet Union that it had ignored in 1945. 
The speeches and writings of those who loved to quote 
from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin about communist aims and 
tactics had a growing audience. The sort of quotations 
usually referred to in such diatribes is illustrated by 
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the testimony given by William Bullitt, one-time ambassador 
to Russia, before the House Un-American Activities Committee. 
He used two quotations from Lenin that were becoming favor-
ites of anti-communist agitators. Lenin, Bullitt pointed 
. . 
out to tbe congressmen, had written: 
We are living not merely in a state but in a system 
of states; and it is inconceivable that the Soviet 
Republic should continue for a long period side 
by side with imperialist states. Ultimately one 
or the other must conquer. Meanwhile, a number of 
terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and 
the bourgeois states is inevitable. 
It is necessary to-use any ruse, cunnipg, unlawful 
method, evasion, concealment of truth.l 
The anti-communists were on the move. 
ii. "Containment" by Mr. "X" 
During the process of the national debate on the 
Marshall Plan, an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet 
·1. William c. Bullitt, *'The Communist Creed," Vital Speeches, 
13: 15 (May 15,~ 1947) , 460. This same quote from Lenin is 
used by John Foster Dulles in War or Peace? (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 10; and by Paul Winterton 
in Inguest on an Ally (London: Cresset P~ess, 1948), 
p. 10. 
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Conduct" appeared in the July issue of Foreign Affairs, 
signed mysteriously by "X". At first the article aroused 
only mild discussion, but when it was learned that the 
mysterious "X" was probably none other than George Kennan, 
head of the State Department*s planning staff, the article 
became considered as a definitive statement of American 
policy toward Russia. 
The article affirmed that the Kremlin undoubtedly 
believed that conflict with the West was inevitable, but 
asserted that this does not mean that they have a do-or-die 
program to overthrow our society by a given date. 1 "The 
theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capital-
ism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry 
about it. 112 The author expressed the conviction that 
Russia is essentially politically and socially unstable. 
This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. 
But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of 
this author it is a strong one) that Soviet power, 
like the capitalist world of its conception, bears 
within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the 
sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.3 
Since we can expect ·sometim~ in the future Russian decay 
and change, and since the West has the atomic bomb and is 
stronger than Russia, the United States would be warranted 
1. X (George,Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," 
Foreign Affairs, 25:4(July, 1947), 572. . 
2. Ibid., p. 572. 3. Ibid., p. 580; 
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entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy 
of containment, designed to confront the R~ssians 
with unalterable counter-force at every point 
where they show signs of encroaching upon1the interests of a peaceful and stable world. 
The assumptions. behind this policy of containment 
were to be decisive in American foreign policy for many 
years and still largely prevail. Some alternatives were 
discussed in the debate that followed the article's ap-
pearance, ranging from "appeasementtt to "preventive war," 
but none modified the posture that the State Department 
had assumed toward Rus~ia.2 
1. Ibid., p. 581. 
2. One of the most interesting alternatives suggested was 
that of Walter Lippmann in The Cold War (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1947), in which he said that the 
Soviet thrust into Eastern Europe was not to be under-
stood in terms of communist proselytism so much as the-
fulfillment of Russian imperialist ambitions that ante-
dated the communist revolution by many years. Lippmann 
held that, although communist expansion must be con-
fronted with counter-force, the most immediate objective 
of American policy ought to be to get the Red Army out 
of Eastern Europe through negotiations. He even advo-
cated evacuating American troops from Europe if neces-
sary to win this concession. This was one of the 
earliest suggestions of "disengagement" as an aim for 
American policy. Mr. Kennan has changed his own mind 
in recent years, and is now, in his unofficial role 
of foreign affairs pundit, the major voice calling for 
disengagement. It is interesting to speculate what 
might have happened if he had had his conversion 
experience earlier. 
0 
0 
3. Crisis in Berlin 
i. A New Deal for West Germany 
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By this time peace treaties had been signed with all 
the defeated countries but Germany herself. The negotia-
tions for a German treaty had been going on for so long 
that the possibility of arr~ving at one suitable to both 
Russia and the West was very dim indeed. The continuing 
stalemate and lack of decisive action in a Germany experi-
encing the depths of despair was becoming inc~easingly 
unbearable. After two and a half years of fruitless nego-
tiations, the Western powers decided that there was no 
hope of achieving a united Germany with a government 
chosen freely by the electorate in the foreseeable future. 
Unwi~ling to compromise on the issue of free elections, 
France, Britain, and the United States determined to attack 
the problems in West Germany without waiting for a treaty 
and united government. 
Aiming at economic and political stability in the 
Western sectors, they decided that the best way to realize 
the goal was through currency reform and constitutional 
government. Plans were drawn up for the election of a 
constituent assembly representing the three Western zones 
to write a federal constitution. It was realized that the 
,, Soviets might take offense at this action, but "the 
possibility of Soviet retaliations has been fully 
considered and discounted," it was reported. "In the 
view of the American and British commanders, the risk 
exists but is well worth taking."1 
Arrangements for the reform of West German currency 
proceeded rapidly. The utter worthlessness of the occu-
pation Marks was holding up economic recovery. A prime 
factor in the collapse of the currency system was that 
the Russians, having plates for the currency, had 
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flooded West Germany with the paper money. The deteriora-
tion of the occupation Mark ha~ virtually led to a barter 
type of exchange based primarily on American cigarettes. 
Almost as many transactions were occurring on the Black 
Market as on the open market. 
The Russians did react vigorously to these Western 
moves·, claiming that the West did not really want a 
re-united Germany and was doing its best to prevent one. 
The Soviets increased their pressure on West Berlin, 
pressure which had been building up for some time. The 
gradual tightening of restrictions on the Western sectors 
of Berlin had virtually eliminated industry there, and all 
rail shipments out of West Berlin had been prohibited 
since April. To give further warning about ~he powers 
1. "Germany: Agreement in the West," Newsweek, 31:24(June 
14, 1948)' 36. 
they held over the Western sectors, on June 11, the 
Russians stopped all rail traffic into the city for a 
twenty-two hour period. 
ii. Blockade of the City 
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The Western powers did not change their plans for 
currency reform, but introduced the new Deutches Mark on 
June 18. The Russians stated that they would have to 
eliminate the possibility of the dumping of old currency 
into East Germany, and closed all land routes across 
their occupation zone to the Western zones of the en-
? 
claved city. The fact that the strangulation of Western 
communications with Berlin had built up gradually from the 
first of April through the end of June had left the West 
confused and unaware of exactly what was happening. 1 
As several days passed and the blockade was not 
lifted, the situation of West Berliners, completely de-
pendent upon supplies from the Western powers, became 
desperate. It became increasingly clear that the Russians 
had determined to force the British, French, and Americans 
out of Berlin by making it impossible for them to supply 
the population. Tension mounted to close to the breaking 
point. 
1. Harry S. Trumen, Memoirs (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), II, 122. 
The decision was made in Washington and London 
neither to force the way into Berlin nor to withdraw. 1 
The now famous airlift was begun, and, for some reason--
probably because they expected it to fail and because 
they did not want to be maneuvered into firing the first 
shot--the Russians allowed traffic to fly through the 
air corridor to the city. This airlift was to continue 
for almost eleven months, providing an average of 4000 
tons of supplies daily to the blockaded city. A non-
violent solution had been found. 
1. Ibid. 
53 
CHAPTER V 
ASSUMPTION OF RUSSIAN MILITARY THREAT: AUGUST, 1948-1949 
1. The Height of Tension 
i. Analyzing Russian Motives 
The Berlin Blockade marked the lowest depths to which 
Western relations with Russia had fallen in the three years 
since the end of the war. Most people interpreted the 
blockade as an attempt to expose Western weakness, embar-
rass America before the eyes of Europe, and at the same 
time gain control of West Berlin without firing a shot. As 
Herbert Agar assessed it, the blockade was "an intelligent 
and seemingly irresistible way of destroying British and 
American prestige in Germany."1 
Others speculated that the Russians may have had 
broader purposes in the blockade, and had hoped to draw 
the West into at least a limited war. George Fielding 
Eliot, who by~ now had reversed his previous analysis of 
our relations with Russia (see above page 30), surmised: 
the Soviet estimate must have been either that 
the Western Powers would leave Berlin because 
1. Agar, op. cit., p. 79. 
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of their inability to feed the population of 
the three western zones of the city, or that 
• • • they would try to ram an armored convoy 
through by road. This latter move might, if 
resisted, have meant war. Only the Soviet high 
command knows whether they meant to resist. If 
they did not then they must have been planning 
their own humiliating retreat before a display 
of Western force, which is unlikely. 
55 
It is far more likely • • • that they 
were trying to put themselves into the position 
of being attacked by the Western powers, so that 
they could afterward plead self-defense in the 
court of their own and world public opinion. 
It is also likely that they expected to have to 
fight, but hoped to limit actual hostilities to 
the immediate area concerned.! 
Although Major Eliot's thesis must be taken seriously, 
it seems more probable that the estimate which John Thompson, 
Berlin correspondent of Newsweek, gave on the occasion of 
the blockade is accurate. Assuming that its aim was to 
embarrass the West and get them out of Berlin, he pointed 
out that "the Soviet technique for ousting us from Berlin 
is obviously designed to avoid major conflicts which could 
dramatize the situation sufficiently to provoke war."2 
General Lucius Clay, allied commander. in Berlin, drew 
similar conclusions. He reported to President Truman that 
the Russians probably did not want a war, but rather a 
1. George Fielding Eliot, If Russia Strikes (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 56-57. 
2. John Thompson, "Stranglehold on Berlin," Newsweek, 
· 31:26(June 28, 1948), 29. 
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major victory without war. 1 
It is more difficult than usual to read the mind of 
the Russian high command in this instance, but it is 
certain that the American public entertained the gravest 
fears. A late June poll indicated that 74 per cent of the 
people responded "yes" to the question, "Do you expect the 
United States to be at war within the next ten years?"2 
Almost one-third (32 per cent) said in September that they 
expected the country to be at war within the next twelve 
months. 3 
Like a shadow, with the heightened fear of war came 
increased anxiety about a surprise attack. The. title of 
Major Eliot's book, If Russia Strikes, expressed a dread 
that many had. He warned that the "danger of war was a 
grim reality," and that the fear that the free world felt 
was no longer vague and distant, but "definite, personal, 
and ever ·present."4 
According to Gabriel Almond's estimate--and the 
public opinion polls bear him out--American "war panic" 
1. Harry s. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), II, 122. 
2. Almond, op. cit., p. 91. 3. Ibid. 
4. George Fielding Eliot, If Russia Strikes (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949) pp. 2, 29. 
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reached its peak in mid-1948. 1 Although the immediacy of 
the fear of war was to wane in succeeding months to a 
degree, the series of crises since the end of the war had 
produced a general and persisting anxiety about the 
threat of Russian attack. 
ii. Further Disquieting Notes 
Though the development of the Berlin blockade was 
such that it made any analysis of Russian motives and plans 
problematic, the experience of the blockade convinced the 
American people that Russia posed an immediate military 
threat. Evidence that they might be right· was to be found 
in the new interpretations of communist theory being made 
by Russians them~elves. N. Rubinstein, an official 
theoretician writing in the New Times, indicated what 
appeared to be a novel development in communist theory on 
war. He wrote that the Bolsheviks 
recognize the justice of wars of liberation, non-
aggressive wars, the aim of which is to defend a 
nation against outside attack and attempts to 
enslave it, or to deliver the people from capi-
talist servitude, or lastly, to liberate a colony 
or dependent country from oppression by the im-
perialists.2 
1. Almond, op. cit., p. 92. 
2. N. Rubinstein, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Its Princi-
ples," New Times, No. 12(March 17, 1948). 
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Rubinstein stated that the Red Army's role is as a 
possible "implement for the emancipation of the toiling 
masses in justifiable wars of liberation. nl This was 
written just before the strangulation of Berlin began. 
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Signs that there were highly explosive possibilities 
in the Berlin crisis came from another source, too. It 
is never safe to give too much weight to evidence supplied 
by communists who defect to the West, but neither can one 
safely ignore their testimony. G. A. Tokaev, a Russian 
officer in Berlin, fled to the West in early 1948. He 
testified that 11feverish" war preparations were being made 
in Russia with great "urgency." "There is no possible 
doubt," he wrote, "that as soon as Stalin is satisfied 
that the u. S. s. R. is sufficiently strong, he will give 
the word for a general attack on the West. There will be 
u2 
• • • Tokaev claimed to have been present no warnings. 
at top level meetings with Stalin, Malenkov, Molotov, and 
others in which strategy for war was being planned, 
aggressive war. "They [the Kremlin] are now fully recon-
ciled to the fact that their brand of world revolution 
means war." 3 
1. Ibid. 
-
2. G. A. Tokaev, Stalin Means War (London: George Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, Ltd., 1951), p. 185. 
3. Ibid., p. 187. 
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The fact that the West had the atomic bomb at this 
time throws doubt on the accuracy of Tokaev's statements. 
Our monitoring devices were not to record a ~ussian 
atomic explosion until September, 1949. It is true, how-
ever, that after Mr. Truman announced our knowledge of 
the explosion, Molotov retorted that Russia had had an 
atomic bomb for a year. Perhaps they had; at least they 
knew they would soon have one. 
It is in addition impossible to know whether or not 
Stalin was completely sane during this period of his life. 
During the later phase of "de-Stalinization" in Russia, 
some of his comrades seemed to think that he was not. 
However, this was not the level of speculation of 
the mass of Americans. Their opinions about the probabil-
ity of Russian attack rested upon emotional responses to 
events that seemed like threats of war. In the latter 
half of 1948 there can be no doubt but the preponderance 
of American opinion assumed the likelihood of military 
conflict. Once moving in that direction, public opinion 
had a momentum that made further shifts difficult. 
2. The Birth of NATO 
Although the Marshall Plan was having almost immedi-
ate salutory effects upon the European economy, the belief 
was growing during 1948--especially in response to the 
c 
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Berlin crisis--that the economic aid was insufficient to 
guarantee Western Europe's ability to withstand possible 
military aggression. 1 Although American opinion had re-
acted negatively in 1946 to Churchill's suggestion of a 
"friendly association" of Britain and the United States 
to maintain the peace, opinion was now moving toward 
the possibility of a military alliance with the Marshall 
Plan countries. 2 The senate, showing how thoroughly 
diminished isolationist sentiment was, adopted in June a 
resolution advocating further regional mutual defense 
agreements like that already adopted for the Americas 
at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. 
A bitterly contested election intervened in American 
affairs at this point. The nominating and balloting con-
firmed the fact that the public had rejected both the 
Taft and Wallace approaches to foreign policy. President 
Truman was re-elected by castigating the Republican con-
trolled Eightieth Congress as a "do-nothing Congress," 
although in actual fact it had taken the most momentous 
steps toward peacetime involvement in international affairs 
1. Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 241. 
2. Ibid. See also reports of polls in The Public Qpin~on 
-quirterly, 12:2(Summer, 1948) 549, 760. 
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in the history of the nation. 
Right-wing elements in the country were shocked by 
Truman's completely unexpected victory. Their sense of 
shock combined with the frustration many people were feel-
ing at having their beautiful dreams of a happy postwar 
world ruined. The search for scapegoats soon turned into 
a witchhunt for communist conspirators in high places. 
This could only have happened after the movement of public 
opinion about Russia had taken the direction it did in 
1948. 
Plans for a E~ropean Alliance proceeded after the 
campaign and its aftermath had quieted down. In his 
inaugural address in January, 1949, President Truman 
named as a principal object of American foreign policy the 
establishment of a "collective defense agreement" between 
the United States and other free nations of the North 
Atlantic area. 1 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
agreement was submitted to the senate in June of 1949 
and ratified, over Senator Taft's vigorous opposition, 
July 21, 1949. While the debate was going on, the sense 
of ominous danger was heightened by the disintegration 
of the Nationalist Chinese Government before the 
1. Harry s. Truman, "The Faith By Which We Live," Vital 
Speeches, 15:8(February 1, 1949), 227. 
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unrelenting revolutionary forces. 
At this point in the history of the United States, 
the assumption that there was a strong possibility of 
Russian attack had become basic to American foreign policy 
and military planning. NATO was held to be necessary be-
cause it was believed Russia presented an immediate mili-
tary threat. John Foster Dulles, Republican advisor to 
the State Department and future Secretary of State, called 
article five of the treaty its nhe~rt.u1 Article five 
stated that "the parties agree that an armed attack against 
one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against.them a11.n2 
The idea of the danger of imminent Russian attack 
had reached its full development and had become an integral 
part of the American attitude toward the Soviet Union and 
a formalized assumption of. American foreign policy., 
3. Hardening of the. Status Quo 
It is not within the purpose of this thesis to trace 
through the year·s succeeding 1949 the various ways in. 
which the assumption of the threat of Russian military 
aggression showed itself. Official opinion and p~blic 
1. John Foster Dulles, op. cit., p. 98. 
2. Ibid. 
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opinion had achieved sufficient momentum and had enough 
inherent inertia that their direction has not changed 
appreciably since that year. The Korean War in 1950, 
beginning as it did with a surprise attack by North Korea 
upon the South Koreans, was understood to corroborate the 
soundness of the posture toward the -Soviet Union that the 
American people had assumed. 
President Truman spoke for many when he said in late 
June, 1950, 
the attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all 
doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use 
of subversion to conquer independent nations and 
will now use armed invasion and war •••• 1 
In th~ months following Truman's action in ordering 
American troops into the Korean fighting "the ranks of the 
American people were nearly closed in agreeing that the 
challenge of communist aggression could not possibly be 
allowed to go by default."2 Even Henry Wallace supported 
the president's action. 3 
Much of American policy since 1949 has been deduckion 
from the major premise that Russian surprise attack was an 
1. Agar, op. cit., p. 116. 
2. Foster Rhea Dulles, op. cit., p. 258. For confirmation 
see poll reported in The Public Opinion Quarterly, 15:1 (Spring, 1951), 170. 
3. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and·company, Inc., 1955), I, 560. 
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immediate possibility. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organ-
ization, the Distant Early Warning radar system around 
the continent, the Nike missile sites, and the emphasis 
upon civil defense are some of the deductions from this 
premise. 
On September 24, 1949, President Truman announced 
that a nuclear explosion had taken place in Siberia. 
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The Russians had an atomic bomb. It is tragic that 
American policy and public opinion had completed its turn 
from optimistic hopefulness to the expectation of war at 
that very time when the whole concept of war was made 
utterly irrational. The Soviet Union and the United 
States could.now ~reaten each other with mutual extermina-
tion, but neither could hope to win a war between them-
selves. Since wars are fought to be won, the very term 
. 
"war" had become obsolete. 
In spite of this, throughout the 1950's the American 
press, government, and people have continued to think in 
terms of the threat of war. Until the understanding of 
what nuclear conflict means has caught up with their 
antagonism toward Russia, the ~erican people will continue 
to be victims of a tragic madness, still living in a world 
that ceased to exist in the fall of 1949. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS OF THE SHIFT OF PUBLIC OPINION 
What caused public opinion to move from cautious op-
timism toward Russia to the belief that the West was in 
danger of imminent Russian attack~ In attempting to 
answer this question, we must attempt to find a theory 
that fits the development of public opinion as it has 
been outlined in preceding chapters. 
1. The Passing of a Superficial Friendship 
Several possible answers could b~ given to our ques-
tion. One is that the reversion of public opinion to 
hostility toward Russia was m~rely a return to' what had 
been "underground" during the war. The war against a 
common foe made it necessary to achieve a superficial 
layer of friendlines~, but when the f~ghting was over we 
were able to revert to our more fundamental suspicious 
attitude. This answer. is implied by several analysts of 
Soviet-American relations. 1 
It is probably true that a future historian will 
see the conflict between Russia and the United States 
1. This seems, for example, to be the viewpoint of 
William Appleman Williams in op. cit., p. 4. 
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as one of long duration, broken only briefly by the war. 
Yet it is not accurate to conceive o'f American goodwill 
toward Russia during the war as merely floating on the 
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top of deeper unchanged hostility. Before the war 
Americans were generally negatively disposed toward the 
Soviet Union. This attitude was re-inforced by the 
Finnish War and the Stalin-Hitler pact. But by 1943, 
after being allied with the Russians for over a year, 
American public opinion had made a genuine shift. Opinion 
poll data cited earlier bear this out. 1 
In general, public opinion on particular subjects 
expresses itself in· simplified positive and negative moods. 
The mood toward Russia was definitely positive at the end 
of the Second World War and, given proper encouragement, 
could have continued to be so 4isposed. If'public opinion 
after an interlude returns to a previous po~ition, it is 
because new forces have been pushing it to that position 
again and not because it is "remembering" how it used to 
feel. 
2. Simple Reaction to Events 
A second possible answer to the question as to why 
American opinion moved toward belief that the West was in 
1. Above, pp •. ~2-14. 
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immediate danger of Russian attack is that the shift was 
due to spontaneous reactions to objective events. This 
answer is the popular one, but it is too neat and simple. 
It ignores the nature of public opinion. Public opinion 
is not creative and does not interpret events on its own. 
As Walter Lippman has pointed out, it reacts to events 
and proposals with either positive or negative moods: 
The formally insti-
tuted leaders of public opinion and the informal leaders 
with their personal followings supply interpretations to 
the events which the mass of opinion approves or dis-
approves. 
Usually, by the time the public h~ars about an event, 
the happening is no longer merely objective fact. Re-
porters always do an important ~easure of interpreting by 
the way they relay information about an event. Along with 
news of the·happening itself comes news of official re-
action. Knowledge of an event does not reach the public 
as an undifferentiated complex reality; it comes with 
choices made as to which factors are important and with 
subtle but unmistakable emotional overtones. 
1. Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1955), p. 19. 
68 
If American opinion arrived at the conclusion that 
events showed Russia posed a military threat, it was not 
because the public "thought the problem out" itself. 
Rather, it accepted the understanding of these events 
provided by opinion leaders. 
3. Led by the Elite 
The above suggests a third answer to the question. 
It is this: American attitudes toward Russia developed 
in the direction they did because they were led in that 
direction by the foreign policy opinion elite, that is, by 
those leaders whose opinions are influential with the pub-
lic. The foreign policy opinion elite includes government 
leaders, those in sensitive positions in mass communica-
tions, respected persons with followings of their own, 
and persons representing groups with particular attitudes 
on particular problems. 
Were the American people led into hostility toward 
Russia by this elite1 There is no doubt but that'our 
investigations have produced evidence that accords with 
this theory. For example, President Truman did act to 
lead opinion at a very crucial time when opinion was still 
somewhat flexible. The fact that he introduced Churchill 
at Fulton in March, 1946, and sat on the platform with 
him, gave a touch of official sanction to Churchill's 
c 
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warnings about Russia and suggestions for an Anglo-American 
defensive association. The furor which followed that speech 
showed that it had not just reflected public opinion; but 
moved Qeyond it in significant ways. 
Since it is the function of the executive in the 
American system to take the initiative in foreign affairs, 
one might hold that the Truman administra~ion decided upon 
a negative, tough, suspicious attitude toward.Russia at a 
time when the public still had a great deal of sympathy 
wi.th the Soviets, and by subtle moves led the people into 
a similar attitude that would back the administration's 
"get tough with Russia" policy. To see whether or not 
this is an adequate explanation of what happened it will 
be necessary to inquire into the relationship between pub-
lic opinion and foreign policy. 
4. The Relationship between Public Opinion 
and Foreign Policy 
i. No Power ·in the Mass 
A number of different descriptions of the relation-
ship between public opinion and foreign policy in the 
United States have been given. At one end of the scale, 
c._Wright Mills tends toward the position that in modern 
America the mass of public opi1;1ion has pr·actically no 
effect on foreign policy, but merely reflects the thinking 
of the ttpower elite." He holds that 
c 
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Within the United States today three broad levels 
of power may now be distinguished: the top of 
modern America is increasingly unified and often 
seems wilfully coordinated. At the top there has 
emerged an elite whose power probably exceeds that 
of any small group of men in world history •••• 
The middle levels are often a drifting set of 
stalemated forces. The middle does not link the 
bottom with the top. The bottom of this society 
is politically fragmented and even as a passive 
fact, increasingly powerless; at the bottom is 
emerging a mass society. 
Mills points out the complexity of the problems faced 
and the extreme distance from the centers of decision the 
average person feels himself to be. As a.result, the mass 
of the public has resigned the policy and decision making 
powers in foreign affairs entirely· into the hands of the 
military, political, and economic elite. 2 
It is certainly true as Mills emphasizes that the pub-
lic has no effective opinion on many matters of great im-
portance. The public rarely rouses itself enough to make 
its pressures felt in the decisions that must constantly 
be made in foreign affairs. 
However, the public does play a much more fundamental 
role in foreign policy than Mills::gives it credit for. Its 
role is two-fold. In the first place, public opinion is 
1. C. Wright Mills, The Causes of World War Three (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 21. 
2. Ibid • 
.............. 
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decisive in setting what Gabriel Almond calls the "ideo-
logical consensustt within which foreign policy operates.1 
This consensus consists of "agreement on the main themes 
of contemporary foreign policy--resistance to communist 
expansion by economic, diplomatic, propaganda, and, if 
necessary, military means, and the establishment of a 
peaceful international order •••• n2 The elite share 
in this consensus, primarily because they have arisen out 
of the aggregate of citizens and partly because the tenure 
of elected officials, and appointive office holders de-
pends upon a degree of responsiveness to the public's 
wishes. 
In the second place, within the consensus of general 
values and aims, the public allows its elite in foreign 
policy a large measure of freedom to handle matters of 
strategy and technique. Occasionally, however, the pub-
lic will become concerned about a particular issue and 
e~ert great pressure upon the elite. For example, in 1954 
when some government officials attempted to lead public 
1. Almond, op. cit., p. 15?· 
2. Ibid •. Ernest Lefever makes roughly the same point when 
he says that the public sets the national value con-
sensus, and "the national value consensus defines the 
limits within which the government mus·t act and sets 
the goals which our leaders are morally obligated to 
pursue." Op. cit., p. 166. 
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opinion into approval of possible American intervention 
in French Indo-China, the public refused to be led and 
made such intervention politically impossible. Another ex-
ample would be the refusal of the American people to con-
sider the possibility of preventive war. 
As a rule, however, the public allows the elite 
freedom to maneuver within the bounds of the ideological 
consensus. "The influence of the elite • • • in policy 
making varies with the level of public concern with the 
issue."1 The more public concern, the less elite influ-
ence. 
It is not true, then, that the main thrust of American 
foreign policy has been set independently of the mass opin-
ion. Mass opinion sets the boundaries within which the 
elite may maneuver and occasionally will force a policy 
upon the leadership or refuse to accept particular tactics. 
ii. Too Much Irresp~nsible Power in the Mass 
Walter Lippmann approaches the problem of the rela-
tionship between public opinion and foreign policy with a 
theory almost opposi·te to that of C. Wright Mills, at 
least in its emphasis. Whereas Mills asserts that the 
mass of public opinion has almost no effect on foreign 
1. Almond, op. cit., p. 142 .. 
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policy, Lippmann holds that the public has great influence, 
in fact, far too much infiliuence on !de!cisions about foreign 
affairs. "The unhappy truth is," states Mr. Lippmann, 
"that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively 
wrong at the critical junctures" of world affairs, and 
has forced democratic governments to make the wrong moves. 1 
The rule to which there are few exceptions • • • is 
that at critical junctures, when the stakes are 
high, the prevailing mass opinion will impose what 
amounts to a veto upon changing the course on whi'ch 
the government is at the time proceeding.2 
Lippmann holds further that a primary reason for the 
decay of the Western democracies today is that the executive 
power has been consistently eroded, and the pressures of a 
public opinion that is largely out of touch with the real 
situation have became decisive in foreign policy. 3 As 
evidence for his thesis Lippmann describes'what he feels 
was the destructive role of public opinion in such matters 
as the repudiation of Wilson, the failure to prepare for 
war in 1939-1940, and the too rapid demobilization of 
American forces in 1945-1946. Lippmann explains this 
flaw in public opinion as being primarily due to its iner-
tia. 
1. Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1955), p. 20. 
2. Ibid. , p. 19. 
-
3. Ibid., p. 24. 
-
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The movement of public opinion is slower 
than the movement of events. Because of that, 
the cycle of subjective sentiments on war and 
peace is usually out of gear with the cycle of 
objective·4evelop~ents. Just because they are 
mass opinions there is an inertia in them. 
The opinion deals with a situation which no 
longer exists.l 
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~ere is a great measure of accuracy in Lippmann's 
theoretical approach to the workings of public opinion. 
The public has had a growing ability to apply pressures 
on the executive in Western democracies. Too, this mass 
opinion has a momentum and inertia which tend to keep it 
moving in the same direction, even after circumstances 
which made that direction wise have altered substantially. 
However, Walter Lippmann makes the same error that Mills 
and others writing in this field tend to make. He has 
taken a particular pattern found within the relationship 
between public opinion and foreign policy elites and 
asserts that it is an adequate description of the total 
process. 
The exceptions to Lippmann's thesis are too im-
portant to be dismissed easily. In the first place, 
although the mass opinion has had growing power in the 
democracies, it is also true that the executive in American 
government has been given increasing powers of decision in 
1. Ibid., pp. 20-21 • 
............. 
foreign affairs. Presidents Roosevelt and·Truman were 
able to act with much greater freedom and initiative, as 
far as public opinion was concerned, than was Wilson. 
Mills is right in holding that the foreign policy elite 
have unprecedented decision making powers. 1 
In direct answer to Lippmann, Henry Wriston has 
written: 
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The outstanding fact today is that the execu-
tive has the initiative in foreign policy to a 
degree unknown before in our h~story •••• Public 
demand is always for the exercise of that initi-
ative, for clear and explicit statements of policy, 
for energy and adroitness in pursuit of the 
national objectives.Z 
In many places where public opinion has overruled 
the elite, the problem·was'that the leadership was weak 
and improperly exercised. Sometimes this has been due to 
the fact that the elite themselves had only very tenta-
tively come to grips with the new facts. This appears to 
have been the situation in the first year after the end 
of World War II, when Lippmann says the public forced the 
government into a soft attitude toward Russia. The fact 
is, though, that Truman made no decisive shifts in 
American policy toward Russia until mid-1946, not so much 
1. Mills, op. cit., p. 21. 
2. Henry M. Wriston, Diplomacy in a Democracy (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1956 , p. 94. 
because he feared public opinion, but because he had not 
settled the ambiguities in his own attitudes. 
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In the second place, public opinion is not always 
wrong at. critical junctures. Lippmann himself admits 
that the Marshall Plan is an important exception to his 
thesis. 1 The public veto of American intervention in 
Indo-China ~ould not be classed as a critical error by 
any means. It is also anything but self-evident that the 
American public was wrong to be optimistic about the 
Soviets and give Russia the benefit of the doubt. In 
fact, compared with the records of kings and dictators 
who are free to respond to "objective facts," one cannot 
agree that democratic opinion has erred more radically 
at times of crisis. 
In the third place, although public opinion does have 
a tendency to lag behind events, this is not an invariable 
condition. Public opinion was able to move very rapidly 
and make extremely difficult adjustments in the three 
years following the war. The public was not at all far 
behind the State Department and President Truman in their 
coming to the position that Russia was a threat to 
American security. This is evident in the October public 
1. Walter Lippmann, loc. cit., p. 19. 
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opi~ion poll which showed in 1945 that 54 per cent of the 
population expected war within twenty-five years, rising 
to 64 per cent in March of 1946. By mid-1946, half of 
the population thought that Russia was out.to dominate as 
much of the world as possible. This appears to be an 
instance when executive opinion and popular opinion moved 
very closely together. 
Lippmann himself admitted that the Marshall Plan was· 
a perfect example of the mass of the public rising to a 
crisis and moving to a proper decision with the executive. 
They even moved ahead of some influential members of the 
elite. "Congress would never have been cooperative if 
pubJ::ic opinion had not given it a stir-o;ttg impulse to such 
. . ,,1 
act1.on. 
There has never been a better example of how pub-
lic opinion, in a sprawling federal natio~, can 
inform itself and bring pressure to bear, once it 
has been roused to make the effort of thinking.l 
There are enough exceptions of significant proportions 
to Lippmann's theses to make them unacceptable as a 
comprehensive theory concerning the relationship between 
public opinion and the foreign policy elite. 
1. Wriston, op. cit., p. 98. 2. Agar, op. cit., p. 78. 
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iii. Toward a Theory of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 
OUt of the discussion of c. Wright Mills' and Walter 
Lippmann's conceptions of the relationship between the 
mass of public opinion and the formulations of the foreign 
policy elite have emerged several general principles which 
we may here .summarize. 
(1) Public opinion has its primary effect on foreign 
policy and its formulators by establishing the value con-
sensus within which ~oreign policy operates and the gen-
eral goals which it must seek. 
(2) American public opinion allows the foreign policy 
elite a large measure of initiative and freedom within the 
bounds·of the general consensus. 
(3} Ordinarily public opinion expresses itself in 
approving or disapproving policies or ideas offered by 
the foreign policy opinion elite. It does not originate or 
create on its own. 
(4) Occasionally and unpredictably, the body of public 
opinion will become aroused about a p~rticular issue and 
force its att~tude upon its leaders. 
(5) Public opinion moves with a certain amount of 
inertia and tends to continue in the same direction, some-
times with the result of having opinion lag behind changes 
in circumstances. However, this does not happen invariably. 
Public opinion, when the issues before it are fairly clear, 
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can shift with surprising rapidity. 
Before we have a theory adequate for the analysis we 
are trying to make, it is necessary to inquire more pre-
cisely into the way public opinion in a democracy chooses 
the broad outlines within which the elite administers for-
eign policy. 
iv. In the Market for Foreign Policy 
In a highly suggestive metaphor, Gabriel Almond has 
compared the process by which this is done to people buying 
in a market. 
Foreign policies themselves • • • are the product 
of leadership groups (elites) who carry on the 
specific work of policy formulation and policy 
advocacy. The public share in policy decisions 
may be compared, with important qualifications, 
to a market. It buys or refuses to buy the 
"policy products" offered by ~ompeting elites.l 
The primary qualifications to the metaphor 
are that policy products cannot be felt, tasted, 
and weighed. They are predictions of consequences 
of action, hardly a tangible product with regard 
to which consumer preferences can easily be 
registered.2 
The factor that is necessary for this process to be a 
democratic one is that there must be genutnel competing 
elites offering alternative policies and inte retations. 3 
"In most cases, the influential policy altern tives placed 
1. Almond, op. cit., p. 28. 2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 192. 
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before the public • • • represent in more or less articu-
late form the vaguer impulses and preferences of the 
masses."1 
Let us see if this approach of Almond's fits the data 
that we have concerned the shift of American attitudes to-
ward Russia. In 1945-1946 when the shift of opinion was 
in process there were roughly three competing foreign 
policies before the public. Henry Wallace symbolized the 
optimistic, trusting approach to Russia and a policy of 
doing everything possible to maintain Soviet friendship • 
... 
Senator Robert A. Taft symbolized the attitudes of those 
who'were not only very suspicious of Russia, but also 
desired as little involvement in international affairs 
as possible. The official government leadership--Secre-
taries of State Byrnes and Marshall and President Truman--
symbolized a get "tough" with Russia attitude, which meant 
refusal to give in in negotiations on points held to be 
important and the development of a strong military posture. 
Taft and Wallace were both very clear in asserting that 
they differed with administration policy as it was develop- . 
ing, and both were articulate in proclaiming their own 
points of view. 
1. Ibid., p. 142. 
-
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In mid-1946, the people "bought" the Truman-Byrnes 
policy and attitude toward Russia, thus changing the di-
rection in which opinion had been moving at the end of 
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the war. The poll data cited earlier point to this period 
as the turning point. In the first quarter of 1946 the 
percentage of the population expecting war in twenty-five 
years jumped to well over 60 per cent and the percentage 
expecting war in ten years rose to about 50 per cent. 
From early 1946 on, well over a majority in Gallup polls 
thought that Russia was trying "to build herself up to be 
the ruling power of the world." The percentage advocating 
that we should make every effort to keep friendly with 
Russia dropped to 15 per cent. Sixty per cent of the 
American public indicated that they thought American 
policy toward Russia was too soft. 1 This all adds up to 
the fact that a little less than a year after the end of 
the war, the majority of American opinion had shifted 
toward a suspicious, hostile attitude toward Russia and 
was ready for a "tough" foreign policy. 
Why did the public ''buyu the Truman-Byrnes ·policy? 
In this writer's opinion, the reasan was that the Truman-
Byrnes interpretation of the situation seemed more in 
1. All the above poll data and their sources have been 
cited before. 
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accord with what was happening. The people had seen 
Russia incorporate into her own Soviet Union 24,355,500 
non-Russian peoples since 1939, "more than the populations 
of Canada, Sweden, New Zealand, and Norway combined. The 
273,947 square miles acquired ~ince 1939 exceeded the areas 
of France, Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal combined.nl 
Russia had repudiated Western trust and good will by 
violating the Yalta agreements and turning the nations of 
Eastern Europe into satelites. Negotiations over postwar 
problems had turned into interminable wrangles, giving 
many Americans the conviction that the Soviets were not 
interested in European recovery or in reaching agreements 
with the West. In addition to this, while the United 
States and Great Britain disarmed, the Soviets maintained 
a strong military force. These and other actions created 
a hostile mood which expressed itself in acceptance of the 
"tough" policy toward Russia. 
v. An Accumulation of Misint~rpretations 
There is an alternative explanation to the build up 
of mutual animosity between Russia and the·west. According 
1. E. Day Carman, Soviet ~erialism (Washington, D. C.: 
Public Affairs Press, 5o), p. 9. This territory 
includes the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and 
Lithuania, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia from Rumania, 
Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia, and portions of Finland. 
I' 
'I t, 
ilto this explanation, with their mutual suspic~ons, each 
,, 
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ras quick to interpret any action by the other as threaten-
',~ng, whether it was meant to be' or not, and to reply with 
" ;~ defensive move of his own. This, in turn, was understood 
I' pY the first as evidence of evil intent and fostered ag-
" gressive and defensive maneuvers. Thus, starting with 
I 
each mistrusting the other but having little real malevo-
'1 I, 
lence toward the other, a cumulative build up of actions 
j, 
and reactions led to the impasse that has developed. 
'I I, There is no doubt but that this type of mechanism has 
Qperated in Russian-American affairs. For example, cumula-
II 
tive mutual retaliations definitely played a part in the 
" 
development of the Berlin blockade. Similar processes 
I' 
,I 
complicated the drawing up of agreements for four-power 
1! 
1! 
control of Vienna. 
It 
i1 There is no doubt, either, but that the United States 
f 
ind Russia have given each other grounds for suspicion. 
I 
~1r. Raymond G. McKelvey, who accounts for the problems ~n 
Russian-American Relations primarily in terms of mutual 
1 1 misunderstandings has drawn up a bil of complaints that 
~ 1 ~ach could well submit to the other. Russia could submit 
" I' 
that 
'I 1i1• Raymond G. McKelvey, "Daisies and Foreign Policy," 
1
' Vital Speeches, 12: 4(December 1, 1945, pp. 112-115. 
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American troops fought them in 1918-19 •••• To 
the Soviet we appear to have a bevy of client 
states in this hemisphere. Many are semi-fascist. 
• • • Russia sees us strong-arm Argentine into 
the United Nations Organization over its objec-
tions and at a time when Argentina has one of the 
most flagrantly Fascist dictatorships among our 
neighbors to the South. Russia sees us support 
monarchist-clerical elements in those areas of 
Germany we administer. She finds us apparently 
more interested in Democracy in the Balkans than 
we are in South Carolina. • • • She hears of 
United States Senators querying our soldiers in 
Italy as to whether the soldiers wouldn't think 
it smart to clean-up on the Soviet Union now. 
• • • We bring forth the atomic bomb in collabora-
tion with Britain and Canada without apparently 
giving the Soviet any intimation about what was 
in progress. We decline to share our information 
about atomic energy. We develop bases all over 
the world. • • • We terminate lend lease. Imme-
diately we ~onsult with Britain as to long-term 
financial arrangements to replace it. Apparently 
no such conversations are being held with Russia. 
We seek universal peace-time military training • 
•. • • When we confer in London, the Soviet finds 
itself steadily outvoted.l 
II 
1: Meanwhile the United States sees the huge Soviet 
I! 
rlation 
buttressed in Eastern Europe by a series of satel-
lite states. • • • We see the Soviet securing addi-
tional protection by an agreed removal of Chinese 
interests in Outer Mongolia, and by occupation of 
the Kurile Islands. We see a nation sealed against 
contact with the outside world. • • • We see a 
dictatorship with no popular check on the power 
of its rulers to make war •••• We see a nation 
apparently indifferent to the economic recovery 
of Europe. • • • We see the Soviet stripping like 
locusts the territories it occupies.2 
2. Ibid., pp. 114-115. 
:1 
il 
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Certainly mutual mistrust and misinterpretations of 
~ntentions have helped to foul our relations with the 
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~oviet Union. But· two important points must be born in 
&ind before this is accepted as an adequate explanation to 
F 
the cumulative animosities between the two countries. 
II 
II, " First, although Americans had some fear and suspicions, 
11 
the attitude of the American people and the American govern-
ll th d f h" . "1 f i ment at e en o t e war was pr1mar1 y one o trust n 
II 
I, 
~ussia's peaceful intentions and willingness to co-operate. 
11 
I 
· President Roosevelt displayed what to many now appears to 
" have been an amazing.naivete in dealing with Russia. The 
,, 
truth is that he had faith that Russia and Stalin would 
•I 
cooperate fully in postwar matters. President Truman when 
It 
lie first took office shared in these views. Even though 
II 
I 
tihe discouraging negotiations over Poland's government were 
II 
I[ 
9ausing him to ask questions, Truman still believed that 
'I Russia could be persuaded to live up to the Yalta agree-
:I 
ments. 
I 
1: 
•I It is t~e that Churchill and the British were highly 
'I ~~spicious of Russia and tried mightily to move Truman in 
1, 
that direction. 
ii 
He did not so move, however, until con-
~~need by Molotov, rather than Churchill, that he could 
" nbt trust the Russians. 
II 
At the close of the war it was American decisions 
· that prevailed when differences arose between the United 
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II ,, 
~tates and Britain, both as to the conduct of the closing 
" phases of the war, and the diplomatic strategy. It was 
I' 
I Truman who decided, against Churchill's advice, to have 
1: 
I American troops retire to the agreed occupation areas. 
I' 
Although the British were champions of Poland, it was 
II 
fi 
Truman who convinced the Russians, at least for a while, 
II 
~o broaden the base of the Warsaw government. 1 It was 
,, 
also Truman, through Hopkins, who convinced the Soviet 
I! 
ruler that he should send the foreign minister to the 
I· 
San Francisco Confer~nce and not just second rank diplomats. 
II 
~,twas also Truman who took. the lead in calling for the 
Eotsdam Conference. Churchill was later to complain that 
yoo much time elapsed before President Truman was able to 
,, 
s:ee the Russians in their true light. 2 The po~er of 
~~iplomatic decision had shifted across the Atlantic, and, 
I 
'I i,;n Washington, they still had hopes that they could trust 
it 
Russia to co-operate. 
Therefore, the base upon which Russian-American rela-
I' 
tions rested at this time at the end of the war is not 
adequately described as one of mutual distrust. The 
,, 
~erican government became predominantly suspicious only 
'I 
I 
after it became perfectly clear that the Soviets had no 
I' l~ Truman, Memoirs . . . ' I, 79. 
" 2. Agar, op. cit., p. 10. 
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I! 
,;Lntention of living up to the Yalta agreements. 
In the second place, the theory of cumulative reac-
h 
tions to each other's defensive measures is not adequate 
'I •• 
to explain the forcefulness of the Russian moves. Giving 
II 
II 
Dr. McKelvey's list of reasons Russia might have to fear 
II 
II 
us its full weight, these still do not begin to balance 
I 
Bne Russian tactics of territorial aggrandizement and the 
I, 
~ubjugation of the nations of Eastern Europe. The Soviets 
I• 
I• 
~ay have been laboring under an exaggerated fear of the 
" 
capitalist West that made its reactions to Western moves 
I' 
II 
violent ones. One cannot know. Even if it is so, the 
I 
I' 
fact still remains that the Soviet countermoves were so 
extreme that they destroyed the attitude of friendship II 
that existed in Washington and among the American people. 
'I 
i\ Therefore, the shift ·in public opinion is best ac-
dounted for as an acceptance of the Truman-Byrnes attitude 
,I 
t.oward Russia because this seemed most in accord with the 
II 
dramatic moves Russia had made since the war. 
Once public opinion was moving in the direction of 
II 
hostility and distrust toward the Soviets, it maintained 
i 1ts course and increased in momentum as further events 
II 
cpnvinced more people of Russia's aggressive intentions. 
II 
I 
The circumstances of 1947--Iran's complaint about Russian 
I, 
II 
'I i~terference, the Truman doctrine and its operation against 
I; 
I 
~ommunist pressures on Greece and Turkey, the communist 
'I 
take-over in Hupgary--all added to the conviction that 
I' 
I Russia was a direct threat, economic, political, and 
I, 
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military, to American interests. The public opinion poll 
II 
data quoted above (pp. 30-31, 56) showed the growth of 
II 
fhe fear of war with Russia that this heightening hostil-
,, 
ity carried with it. The fear of war reached its climax · 
II 
~n the Berlin blockade and involved as a basic corollary 
II 
the idea that such a war would begin with a Russian 
~urprise attack. 
I 
II 
Dexter Perkins' comment is very appropriate. 
The more one ponders, indeed, the more one is 
impressed with the folly of the Kremlin in the 
years 1945 to 1948. In the climate of opinion 
which existed at the end of the war, it might 
easily have won for itself the good will of the 
Western World.l 
1!1• Dexter Perkins, Poaular Government and Foreign Policy (Fund for Adult ~ucation Lectures, 1955; LOs Angeles: 
:
1 Anderson, Ritchie, and Simon, 1956), p. 36. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
What conclusions, then, are to be drawn from this ,, il 
II ~urvey of the growth of American attitudes toward Russia? 
II 
:: (1) American good will toward Russia, both popular 
II 
and official, was, though cautious, genuine at the end of 
I! the war. There existed an undercurrent of animosity on 
!I 
~11 levels, but this was over-ridden by a confidence that 
any differences with the Soviets could be worked out. 
I • 
The expectation was that we were entering·an era of peace 
II 
and understanding under the United Nations, an era in 
II 
~~ich,Russia would share fully and responsibly. 
,I 
:1 (2) The Truman administration moved from its position 
I, 
of cautious optimism to distrust.and suspicion during its 
II drawn out negotiations over the governments and peace 
'I 
treaties for nations wqich were being subjugated by the 
I 
Sbviets. 
(3) Once the Truman administration had changed its 
aftitude toward Russia, at least three distinct foreign 
policy alternatives received wide publicity and sought the 
" 
approval of the American public--those alternatives repre-
11 
" sented by Byrnes, Wallace, and Taft. 
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II (4) The greater portion of public opinion reversed 
!I 
1 ~ts attitude toward Russia during the latter half of 
q 
II 
t945 and the first half of 1946, only slightly behind 
'I 
the shift of administra~ion opinion, and in so doing 
I, 
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gave its approval to the offic~al policy of growing firm-
li 
ness. 
I: 
,; (5) Although the public was led in this direction-;..py 
lj 
the Truman administration, it followed primarily because 
~his attitude seemed to be in keeping with events in 
I, 
'I 
Eastern Europe. 
(6) Once moving in the direction of hostility toward 
Russia and fear of Soviet intentions, public opinion 
" 
gathered momentum both through its own internal generation 
~f energy and through the impetus of further Soviet moves. 
I' 
This attitude involved a growing conviction that war be-
tWeen the United States and Russia was inevitable and the 
fear that such a war would begin with a surprise attack 
I' by the Soviet Union. 
(7) The feeling of the heightened probability of 
military conflict and the iimDinent danger of Russian sur-
,, 
p~ise attack solidified in American opinion, both public 
'I 
" and official, during the tensions of the Berlin blockade 
II 
I 
and was formalized in the NATO alliance. 
I, 
II 
'I 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem of this thesis is to trace the develop-
ment of American attitudes toward Russia from the closing 
phase of World War II to the point at which the fear of 
the imminent danger of Russian surprise attack was a 
basic part of this attitude. 
Although Americans generally had been negatively dis-
posed toward Russia before the Second World War, during 
the first year of the alliance this attitude underwent a 
drastic change. Both governmental and public opinion by 
1943 were overwhelmingly favorable toward the Soviet 
Union. Statements by government officials, articles by 
journalists, and public opinion polls indicated a genuine 
admiration for Russia and an expectation that future rela-
tions between the two countries would be characterized by 
mutual respect and co-operation. There was. a s~b-strat~ 
of hostility and distrust in some quarters, but it rep-
resented a distinct minority. 
This optimism on the,part of the American people and 
their government continued into the closing phases of the 
war. Americans were willing to concede to Russia the 
territories she deman4ed and agreed that Russia should 
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have friendly governments in the states of Eastern Europe. 
·Under the terms of the Yalta Conference in early 1945, 
these "friendly governments" in Russia's western neighbors 
would be established by the occupying forces, would be 
representative of all democratic elements in the popula-
tion, and would hold free elections as soon as possible. 
As the war in Europe drew to a close, tensions be-
.. 
tween Russia and the West began to appear. ,\,.Communications 
with Russian occupied territories were severed and commu-
nist governments were forced upon several of these nations. 
Negotiations among the big three aimed at having truly 
representative governments in the Eastern states turned 
into caustic wrangles. The Truman administration showed 
in late 1946 that its attitude toward Russia was one of 
suspicion and distrust by adopting a "get tough with 
Russia" approach to foreign affairs. Public opinion polls 
show that during the first year after the war the American 
people gradually shifted their optimistic attitude toward 
the Soviets to one involving hostility and a feeling that 
the danger of war between the two nations was growing. 
Along with the feeling that war was very possible came 
the corollary that such a war would probably starts with 
a new "Pearl Harbor," a Russian surprise attacl_{. upon the 
West. 
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What the administration meant by "getting tough. with 
Russia" became clear in the Truman doctrine in 1947, a 
policy of containment of communism by economic, political, 
and, if necessary, military means. Tensions continued to 
increase as the economic and political instability of 
Western Europe became more acute. Under the leadership 
of Secretary of State Marshall, the American public rose 
to the occasion by giving overwhelming popular support to 
the Marshall Plan. The wide public discussion of the plan 
served to intensify the sense of danger from Russian com-
munism. 
In June of 1948 the tension between the United States 
and Russia reached its highest pitch as the Soviets biliock-
aded the Western sector of the city of Berlin. The Russians 
were apparently gambling that the West would not retaliate 
with military action and expecting to be able to force the 
West out of Berlin. The possibility of at least limited 
war was great but was avoided by the airlift. Public 
opinion polls showed that the American people accepted 
the blockade as a sign that war with Russia was very 
likely before long. The administration entered the NATO 
alliance to strengthen the West against Soviet military 
aggression should it come~ 
In analyzing the caases why the American public 
changed its attitude toward Russia and gave its support 
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to the Truman administration's tough policy, it is neces-
sary to have a workable theoretical approach to the rela-
tionship between public opinion and foreign affairs. An 
outline of such a theory would include the following 
propositions: (1) public opinion establishes the valu:e. 
concensus within which foreign policy operates and the 
goal which it must seek; (2) public opinion allows the 
executive a fair amount of freedom of movement within the 
coneensus, but occasionally, when aroused, may force its 
attitude on particular issues upon its leaders; (3) public 
opinion does not originate policies or ideas, rather, it 
approves or disapproves ideas suggested by the foreign 
policy elite; (4) public opinion moves with inertia and 
sometimes lags behind changes in circumstances, though it 
can shift with rapidity in response to clear and dramatic 
events; (5) in a democracy, the public effects foreign 
policy by choosing between alternative policies and ideas 
offered by competing foreign policy elites. 
When the above theory is applied to and combined with 
the data concerning the shift of mass opinion about Russia, 
it leads one to the following conclusions. (1) The Truman 
administration moved fr~m its position of cautious optimism 
toward Russia to one of distrust and suspicion in the 
process of the negotiations about the governments of and 
treaties for the nations being subjugated by the Soviet 
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Union. This was not a case of a cumulative build up of 
mutual misunderstandings, but one of the destruction of 
genuine American trust by Russian failure to keep the 
agreements made at Yalta. (2) Once the administration 
had changed its attitude, three types of policies--those 
symbolized by Truman, Wallace, and Taft--competed for 
public acceptance. By mid-1946, the shift in American 
attitudes toward Russia had been made which led the pub-
lic to choose the administration policy. The public 
' 
chose this policy.because it seemed best to fit the situa-
tion which Russia had created. (3) The build up of 
hostility toward Russia continued to develop in 1947 and 
reached a fever pitch in the process of the Berlin block-
ade. During the crisis of the blockade, American opinion 
became convinced that Russia was a military threat and 
. 
that the West was in danger of imminent Russian surprise 
attack. The NATO alliance formaliz·ed this as a basic pre-
supposition of American policy. This presupposition has 
not altered appreciably since, and most American defense 
policy consists of deductions from this premise. 
